

ficaram-se, no entanto, de que aqueles pouco mais fossem mantendo do que um poder nominal, situação que melhor se adequava à exploração de Ormuz como um dos principais alicerces financeiros do Estado da Índia⁸⁵. Daí que Pedro Teixeira observasse que nem sobre os súbditos muçulmanos os reis exerciam uma administração livre, e que, depois de anos em que careciam de permissão do capitão da fortaleza portuguesa para se ausentarem da ilha, até esta possibilidade acabara por lhes ser vedada. Haviam sido reduzidos, praticamente, à condição de fantoches políticos.

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Do que atrás ficou exposto, resulta evidente que a «Breve relacion del principio del reyno Harmuz y de sus reyes...» é um texto indispensável à compreensão da história de Ormuz, tanto pelo carácter único de parte substancial das informações que divulga, como pela feição pormenorizada assumida pela narrativa.

Não quer isto dizer que as palavras escritas por Pedro Teixeira devam ser lidas e utilizadas sem reservas, já que tivemos ocasião de lhe apontar alguns equívocos e omissões. Embora reconhecendo a extrema utilidade da sua obra, devemos admitir que a consulta da mesma não exclui a necessidade de confronto com outras fontes, nomeadamente, crónicas portuguesas sobre a presença no Oriente, e, sobretudo, com os estudos que Jean Aubin dedicou ao reino de Ormuz, os quais já se tornaram verdadeiros clássicos, pelo carácter inovador e rigoroso que o historiador lhes soube imprimir.

⁸⁵ Sobre os rendimentos proporcionados por Ormuz e a respectiva utilidade veja-se João Paulo Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 834-836.

LETTERS FROM A SINKING SULTAN

por

MUZAFFAR ALAM & SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM

«This [King] is naturally a conqueror, and of great heart, and the most indefatigable man that I've ever seen, and an extraordinarily great lord, save now that Fortune goes against him ...»

Martim Afonso de Sousa to Dom João III (1535).¹

The history of sixteenth-century Gujarat occupied a place of significance in the works of both Jean Aubin and Denys Lombard, though it was clearly not central to their preoccupations as researchers. Aubin's first detailed forays into the history of the Gujarat Sultanate came out of his work on the chronicler Nimdihi, and they were renewed when he wrote his classic essay 'Albuquerque et les négociations de Cambaye' in 1971.² In later years, he often expressed a desire to return to this field, concerning which he had collected much material, but was unfortunately unable to publish further on it. If Aubin approached Gujarat, as it were, from the west (via Iran and Portugal), Lombard's interest in Gujarat stemmed from the east, namely on account of the close connections between Gujarat and the Sultanate of Aceh,

¹ «Este [Rei] naturalmente he comquystador he de gramde coraçam he ho mays fragueyro omem que eu numqua vy he muy gramde senhor em demasya senam agora lhe foy a fortuna comtrayra ...». Letter written from Lathi on 1 November 1535, reproduced in Luciano Ribeiro, 'O primeiro cerco de Dio', *Studia*, Vol. 1, 1958, p. 235. For a collection of Martim Afonso's letters from the period (in somewhat modernised Portuguese versions), also see Luís de Albuquerque and Maria do Anjo Ramos, *Martim Afonso de Sousa*, Lisbon, 1989; for an earlier reading and discussion of some of these texts, Georg Schurhammer, 'Cartas de Martim Afonso de Sousa (1534-1539)', in Schurhammer, *Gesammelte Studien, II: Orientalia*, Rome/Lisbon, 1963, pp. 185-205.

² Jean Aubin, 'Indo-islamica I. La vie et l'œuvre de Nimdihi', *Revue des Etudes islamiques*, Vol. XXXIV, 1966, pp. 61-81. Also see Aubin, 'Albuquerque et les négociations de Cambaye', *Mare Luso-Indicum*, Vol. I, 1971, pp. 3-63, reprinted in Aubin, *Le Latin et l'Astrolabe, II: Recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales*, Paris, 2000, pp. 197-250.

the subject of his first monograph and also of one of his last published works, on the French voyager Beaulieu.³ He paid a visit to Surat in the 1990s with the express intention of visiting the tomb of the celebrated Gujarati Sufi intellectual, Nur-ud-Din Raniri, who left a major mark on Aceh under the Sultans, and returned enthused, as both authors of the present essay recall. It is thus as a tribute to these two historians, who were generous colleagues and dear friends, that we present this brief essay.

The essay itself focuses on a set of four Persian documents from the 1530s that are preserved in the the *Cartas Orientais* collection of the Torre do Tombo in Lisbon, and which had been examined by Aubin already in 1952. The reader of the original documents even today finds their covers annotated in Aubin's tiny and meticulous hand, with brief summaries and datings where possible. In 1973, he equally published a valuable essay entitled 'Les documents arabes, persans et turcs de la Torre do Tombo', in which he introduced the entire collection, and presented transcriptions and translations into French of four letters, three from the celebrated Khwaja 'Ata (Cojeatar) to Afonso de Albuquerque (of which one is in Arabic), and one letter, also in Arabic, from a certain Baba 'Abdullah to Dom Manuel.⁴ The letters that we publish here, in the original Persian with an English translation, had been studied by Aubin in the context of his continuing work on sixteenth-century Gujarat and the Portuguese, though he had not completed a transcription or translation of all of them.⁵

What was the context of these four letters, written by Bahadur Shah, the Sultan of Gujarat to various Portuguese authorities in the 1530s? Some broad introductory reflections may not be out of place here. That the 1520s and 1530s were tumultuous and significant years for the political history of northern India can hardly be doubted. The foundation of the Mughal state at Agra and Delhi by the Timurid prince Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Babur in 1526, its initial consolidation by his son Humayun, and then the latter's dramatic displacement by the Afghan warlord Sher Shah Sur occupy the

³ Denys Lombard, *Le Sultanat d'Atjéh au temps d'Iskandar Muda (1608-1637)*, Paris, 1967; Denys Lombard, ed., *Mémoires d'un voyage aux Indes orientales, 1619-1622: Un marchand normand à Sumatra, Augustin de Beaulieu*, Paris, 1996.

⁴ Aubin, 'Les documents arabes, persans, et turcs de la Torre do Tombo', *Mare Luso-Indicum*, Vol. II, 1973, pp. 183-237, reprinted in Aubin, *Le Latin et l'Astrolabe*, vol. II, pp. 417-452. A number of other documents from the *Cartas Orientais* concerning the Persian Gulf were summarised, and rather poorly reproduced, in Jahangir Qa'im Maqami, *Asnâd-i fârsî, 'arabî wa turkî dar ârshîv-i millî-yi Purtughâl: Darbâr-i Hurmûz wa khalij-i Fârs*, Tehran, 1354 Khurshidi. Other Ottoman documents from the same collection have been published episodically, for example in Salih Özbaran, *The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century*, Istanbul, 1994.

⁵ We are grateful to Madame Françoise Aubin for allowing us access to Jean Aubin's draft readings of the documents, and also for furnishing us copies of the photographs taken in the 1950s, which were often clearer than more recent reproductions.

most conspicuous part of the scene, but this should not obscure the fact that other political processes of great importance were taking place at the same time elsewhere, notably in Gujarat and Bengal. In particular, the Gujarat Sultanate seems in these years to have ridden a political roller-coaster, from moments of great and dramatic success to a situation where, by the late 1530s, it has begun to fragment into a number of appanages dominated by groups such as the Afghans, former Ottoman subjects (or 'Rumis'), and Timurid Mirzas related to the Mughals. A particularly striking set of changes in these processes brings those newcomers, the Portuguese into the centre of the picture, though as is well-known the *Estado da Índia* had made creeping inroads into the political economy of Gujarat from the early 1510s on. Relations between successive Portuguese governors and viceroys and the Gujarat Sultanate had been mixed in character at the time of Sultan Muzaffar (1511-26), who had succeeded the long-reigning Sultan Mahmud Bigarha. However, with the death of Muzaffar, and the succession struggle between his sons, relations with the Portuguese too took a definite turn for the worse. Thus, Sultan Bahadur Shah Gujarati, the second son and eventual successor to Sultan Muzaffar, found his coastal territories constantly harrassed by Portuguese fleets very nearly from the inception of his reign. The prosperous port of Rander in the Gulf of Cambay was a particular target, but Portuguese patrolling fleets also made periodic raids on other ports extending as far as Kacch.

If one were to present a schematic picture of the decline of the Gujarat Sultanate, which had after all been a particularly prosperous one in about 1510, we might depict it as a polity that over-extended itself in circumstances when new and powerful rivals had appeared on the scene. The old balance of power, between a relatively modest Afghan state in the heart of the Indo-Gangetic plain, Rajput 'buffer states' between this core and Gujarat, and an open zone of possible expansion in Central India, that had obtained for a good part of the fifteenth century, no longer characterised the century that followed. A possible, and relatively conservative, strategy for the Gujarat Sultans would have been to consolidate their rule over Kathiawar, encroach slightly on the southern Rajput states and Malwa, and to then try and hold this compact territory against the Mughals. But this was not how Sultan Bahadur and his advisers conceived matters. Instead, he embarked on an enormously energetic set of campaigns, that seemed to have ambitions ranging as far as Bombay on the one hand, and Agra on the other. The idea seems to have been a reversal of the classic pattern, in which initially land-locked states in the Indo-Gangetic plain sought maritime outlets by expanding westwards towards the coast. Here instead was a coastal state that sought to broaden its hinterland, but which equally wished to expand the coastal territories under its control. The reversal, when it came, was rapid. Between the mid-1530s and the late 1550s, the Sultanate of Gujarat imploded, leaving it relatively easy prey for the Mughals, once the latter had sorted out their own internal dynastic problems, and also defeated the

Afghan alternative that was grouped around Sher Shah and his immediate successors.

In all of this, the death of Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat himself has a dual importance. As an event, it is invested with some degree of symbolism for Euro-Asian relations, both by contemporaries and later writers. But it is equally interesting as a hinge moment in regional politics, when the seal is set on the decline of the Sultanate. In some senses, the unsuccessful siege of the fortress of Diu by the Gujarat forces and their Ottoman allies in 1538 only confirms what was on the cards in 1537, when the Sultan died by drowning off Diu. *Sultân al-bar, shahîd al-bahr* («Sultan ashore, Martyr at sea»), and *Firangiyân Bahâdur-kush* («Franks, slayers of Bahadur»); these two Persian chronograms, both adding up to the Hijri year 943, summed up the core of the matter for many contemporaries. The first, composed it is said by the *wazîr* of Gujarat, a certain Ikhtiyar Khan, pronounces Sultan Bahadur Shah Gujarati a martyr when he decided to leave the safe shore for the unsafe sea, and gives the year of his death. The second, reported by the Mughal chronicler Shaikh Abu'l Fazl ibn Mubarak, in his celebrated late sixteenth-century work *Akbar Nâma*, accompanies a description of Bahadur's death, and in some manuscripts also a rather striking Mughal miniature depicting the same.⁶

What did in fact happen? It is difficult to say for certain. But we do know that Sultan Bahadur Shah, died at sea under mysterious circumstances on 3 Ramazan 943 A.H. (14 February 1537), after having reigned for some eleven years and three months. He had gone on board a Portuguese vessel to meet the governor of the *Estado da Índia*, Nuno da Cunha, in order to settle some outstanding differences between him and the Portuguese. Sixteenth-century Persian writers such as Mulla 'Abdul Qadir Badayuni are prompt to blame his death on the Portuguese, but do not give details: «Sultan Bahadur was drowned in the sea owing to the treachery of the Firangis», he writes.⁷ The contemporary Hadrami chronicler, Ba Faqih, is more explicit, and explains matters as follows:

«In this year [943 H.] on Monday, 3rd of the month of Ramazan, or the 4th of Ramazan, Sultan Bahadur Shah, Lord of Gujarat, was killed, being murdered by the Frank. It came about in this wise – that a fleet (*tajhîz*) of the Frank arrived before Diu from the south (*fî sâfil*), and when they reached Diu port, Sultan Bahadur embarked, exposing his own person to danger on Khwaja Safar Salman's grab, by way of coming to meet them, accompanied by about ten of his ministers and by the Khwaja Safar Salman. When he reached them they made a show of welcome and polite-

⁶ Abu'l Fazl, *Akbar Nâma*, Vol. I, ed. Ghulam Riza Tabataba'î Majed (Teheran, 1379), pp. 223-25.

⁷ 'Abdul Qadir Badayuni, *Muntakhab ut-Tawârîkh*, 3 Vols., trans. G.S.A. Ranking, W. H. Lowe, and T. Wolseley Haig, Calcutta, 1884-1925, Vol. I, p. 458.

ness (*ikrâm wa hismah*) towards him, and of support against his foes the Mughals who had seized his country – as was related under the year [93]7. [However] they reproached him for sending the sailing-ships to Jiddah as already mentioned, [and] that all he intended was to incite the Turks (*arwâm*) against them. He absolved himself, saying: 'My intention was merely to go on the pilgrimage in them, but nobody apart from the *wazîr* and some of my family consented to go on the pilgrimage'. They would not, however, believe him, and when he left them they sent two grabs in pursuit of him, but he fought them bravely till he and the ministers accompanying him were slain, all except the Khwaja Safar, for him they spared».⁸

The indigenous sources for the history of Sultan Bahadur's reign are in general not numerous. The most important are without doubt the Arabic chronicle of Hajji al-Dabir, and the somewhat later Persian work of Sikandar ibn Manjhu, the *Mirât-i Sikandari*; to these, the Mughal chronicles in Persian at times add details, as does the celebrated early seventeenth century text of Abu'l Qasim Hindushah, better known as 'Firishta'.⁹ A number of contemporary Portuguese materials may be added to these, ranging from the great chronicles – Barros, Correia, Castanheda, and Couto – to other more minor works, and finally the rather abundant documents that are mostly to be found in the Torre do Tombo in Lisbon.¹⁰ Pride of place amongst these contemporary documents should undoubtedly be given to the anonymous text entitled, «Capítulo das cousas que passarão no Reyno de Guzarate depois da morte de Sultão Modafar» («Chapter on the things that happened in the Kingdom of Gujarat after the death of Sultan Muzaffar»), a rather elaborate narrative by a Portuguese writer which begins with the succession struggle at the death of Sultan Muzaffar Shah in 1525.¹¹

The text is often attributed by modern commentators to a certain Diogo de Mesquita Pimentel, who spent time in captivity in Gujarat, and was later present at the fateful occasion in February 1537 when Sultan Bahadur Shah

⁸ R. B. Serjeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 75-76.

⁹ 'Abdullah Hajji al-Dabir, *Zafar ul-Wâlih bi Muzaffar wa Âlih*, 3 Vols., ed. E. Denison Ross, London, 1909-1929; English translation by M. F. Lokhandawala, *Zafar ul Wâlih bi Muzaffar wa Âlihi: An Arabic History of Gujarat*, 2 Vols., Baroda, 1970-74; Sikandar bin Muhammad, *The Mirât-i Sikandari*, eds., S. C. Misra and M. L. Rahman, Baroda, 1961; English translation by Fazlullah Lutfullah Faridi, *Mirâti Sikandari or the Mirror of Sikandar*, Dharampur, 1899.

¹⁰ Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, *História do Descobrimento e Conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses*, 2 Vols., ed. M. Lopes de Almeida, Oporto, 1975. Gaspar Correia, *Lendas da Índia*, 4 Vols., ed. M. Lopes de Almeida, Oporto, 1975. For Diogo do Couto, see the older edition of *Da Ásia, Décadas IV-XII*, reprint Livraria Sam Carlos edn., Lisbon, 1974; also Maria Augusta Lima Cruz, *Diogo do Couto e a Década 8.ª da Ásia*, 2 Vols., Lisbon, 1993-95.

¹¹ This text may be found in the Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/ Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (henceforth referred to as IAN/TT), *Colecção São Vicente*, Vol. XI, fos. 91-111; it is discussed at some length in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'A Crónica dos Reis de Bisnaga e a Crónica do Guzerate: Dois Textos Indo-Portugueses do século XVI', in *Os Construtores do Oriente Português*, Lisbon-Oporto, 1998, pp. 131-54.

was killed. This attributed paternity remains to be thoroughly verified, being based largely on a reference in Gaspar Correia's chronicle, *Lendas da Índia* to the fact that this Mesquita had left behind an account of Gujarat in the period which Correia claimed to have used in his own work. Correia writes:

«And since this section will deal extensively with the King of Cambay, Sultan Badur, it seems right to give an account of him and his affairs, as I saw in an account that was written of him by Diogo de Mesquita Pimentel, who was a captive for many years in the mountains of Champaner ...».¹²

Mesquita, we are aware, was captured in a vessel off Gujarat in the late August or early September 1528, and though allegedly asked by Sultan Bahadur to convert to Islam, refused to do so according to some Portuguese sources, even at the risk of his own life. He was later released in the course of the negotiations over Diu in 1535, but continued to play a role in diplomatic relations between Gujarat and Goa, until Sultan Bahadur's death. It is incidentally possible, but by no means entirely certain, that he is the same as the Portuguese envoy of the same name to Constantinople in the early 1540s. It is worth remarking, at any rate, that he is never mentioned by name in the «Capítulo das cousas ...», whereas several other Portuguese do find a clear place, such as António da Silveira, Simão Ferreira, and the celebrated renegade João de Santiago (whom the text mentions with conspicuous disapproval). Further, the text uses the first person sparingly, and the author never presents himself as an eyewitness to any events, and the celebrated episode (recounted both in the chronicles, and the later anonymous text *Primor e Honra*), in which Mesquita and Bahadur have a confrontation, is left out. Stranger still, in the account in the text of the siege and capture of Chitor fortress by Sultan Bahadur in early 1535 (in which chroniclers such as Castanheda and Couto agree that Diogo de Mesquita himself played a significant role), our chronicler contents himself with a distant and rather conventional description. Above all, the historian must reconcile himself to the fact that Correia's account entitled «Lenda d'el Rey de Cambaya, o Soltão Badur», diverges very substantially from the text of the «Capítulo ...», despite some superficial similarities at the beginning.¹³

Be that as it may, we are certain that the author of the text (whoever he was), had an intimate knowledge of the politics of Gujarat in the late 1520s and early 1530s. What he provides us with in effect is a very detailed account of Bahadur's ascension against his brothers and rivals on the death of Sultan Muzaffar, his actions to prosecute the expansion of the Gujarat kingdom

¹² On Diogo de Mesquita, also see Dejanirah Couto, 'L'itinéraire d'un marginal: La deuxième vie de Diogo de Mesquita', *Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian*, vol. XXXIX, 2000, pp. 9-35. The author is commendably cautious concerning the attribution of the text of the «Capítulo das cousas ...» to Mesquita.

¹³ Correia, *Lendas*, vol. III, pp. 504-33.

both in the direction of Rajasthan and Central India, and his eventual clash with the Mughals. It is with the triumphant advance of the Mughal ruler Humayun, and Bahadur's flight as far as Diu in November 1535 that the chronicle abruptly terminates.

It is clear when we place the anonymous chronicle side by side with other texts in Arabic and Persian – notably Hajji al-Dabir's *Zafar al-Wālih*, and Sikandar ibn Manjhu's somewhat later text *Mirāt-i Sikandarī* (but also some other minor texts in Persian) – that we are dealing with an important, indeed in some respects indispensable, contemporary account of affairs. Two aspects stand out. First, we must note the close attention paid to the role of Afghan mercenary soldiers and notables (including disaffected elements belonging to the erstwhile Lodi Sultanate) in the system of political alliances linking Gujarat, the Mughals, and other rival states in this epoch. The second issue, dealt with to some extent by D. H. A. Kolff, is the crucial contest between Bahadur and the Islamicised Rajput leader from Central India, Silhadi.¹⁴ Very valuable details of the battles and negotiations between the two can be found in the Portuguese chronicle. At the same time, we must bear in mind that the text has a rather open slant, which is itself a matter of some significance for the events of the years from 1534 to 1537. It is clear that throughout the «Capítulo», Bahadur is treated for the most part as cruel, vicious, and the epitome of a Muslim tyrant. This is an image that is carried over in part into later chroniclers like Diogo do Couto («era máo, cruel, e tyranno, e Deos o queria castigar»).

Relations between the Portuguese and Bahadur can be divided into two clear phases. In a first period, we witness growing pressure from the authorities at Goa to gain a foothold in one of the ports of the Gujarat Sultanate, preferably Diu. Instructions dating from the mid-1520s, thus from the very beginning of Sultan Bahadur's reign, make it clear that the Portuguese court had plans in this direction, and was prepared in principle to devote substantial resources to it.¹⁵ For a number of reasons, this turned out to be difficult to implement; internal divisions in the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, and the rather determined resistance by both Bahadur and the sons of Malik Ayaz of Diu, meant that the Portuguese could not do much more than harass Gujarati shipping and raid ports such as Daman and Rander. However, a second phase is inaugurated in about 1534, at the same time that Martim Afonso de Sousa arrives in India with the title of *capitão-mor do mar da*

¹⁴ D. H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and sepoy: The ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-1850*, Cambridge, 1990.

¹⁵ IAN/TT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis da Índia*, no. 17, «Várias cartas para D. Henrique capitão-mor da Índia sobre a tomada da villa de Rumes escritas em Tomar a 7 de setembro de 1526». For a further discussion of these materials, see Diogo do Couto, *Década Quarta da Ásia*, ed. M. Augusta Lima Cruz, Lisbon, 1999, vol. II, pp. 54-58 (note by Sanjay Subrahmanyam entitled 'O interesse e os projectos de conquista de Diu').

Índia.¹⁶ In this phase, the position of Sultan Bahadur worsens, and just when it begins to appear that he may regain some ground, he dies mysteriously. It is this second phase then that is our central concern.

A relatively clear narrative of events in this phase is available to us from the Portuguese chronicler Fernão Lopes de Castanheda. As he presents it, on arriving in India, Martim Afonso was despatched very quickly on an expedition against Daman, «a place in the kingdom of Cambay, situated at the point of a bay on the southern side, some distance up a river, where the king of Cambay had a fortress is was strong and well-provided with artillery, square, and with a bulwark on each corner, and only one door». The captain of this fort is described as a Turk, at the head of a mixed force of Turks and Rajputs. An engagement follows between the Portuguese fleet and the garrison; the fortress is taken and razed, and Martim Afonso moves on to Diu, in order to continue the usual pattern of attacks and skirmishes that the Portuguese had been pursuing since the mid-1520s. Things might have remained in this uneasy equilibrium between the Portuguese and the Gujarat Sultanate, if other factors had not intervened. The most important of these factors, as Castanheda himself admits, was the war that Bahadur began with the Mughals under Humayun. The *casus belli* according to the Portuguese chronicler was a campaign that Bahadur conducted in Malwa, in Central India, in which he took the city of Mandu and killed its ruler. Castanheda suggests that complaints from Mandu reached Humayun, who hence wrote a threatening letter to Bahadur. Whatever be the case – and it may well have been that the Mughals were merely seeking a reason to engage the overly ambitious Bahadur – a major campaign was on the cards by the last months of 1534. Castanheda writes:

«The King of the Mogores sent an ambassador to the king of Cambay, and since he did not wish to do what he asked, there was bad feeling between them, and they made war on each other, which was at once begun through their captains. And since the people of the King of Cambay had the worst of it, he himself decided to go there in person, on which account he decided to make peace with the governor Nuno da Cunha, for he feared that he might take Diu along with the whole sea-coast, while he himself was away against the King of the Mogores. And in order to content him, and to make sure that he would make peace, he gave him Baçaym, on which account he sent an ambassador called Coje Xacoez».¹⁷

A carrot is offered then to the Portuguese, in order to buy off their threat for a time, and the man sent to negotiate it is Shaikh ʿUwais, whom we shall see more of below. The offer is of Bassein on the southern fringes of the

¹⁶ See, in this context, IAN/TT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis da Índia*, no. 22, «Parecer sobre a forma como se poderia subgigar os da cidade de Dio ...» (probably dating to 1533).

¹⁷ Castanheda, *História*, Vol. II, Livro VIII, p. 707.

Gujarat Sultanate, along with some islands, all of which yields a revenue of some 50,000 gold *pardaos* a year. But Nuno da Cunha drives a hard bargain. Not content with the offer, he insists that all ships departing from Diu be obliged now to pass through Bassein and pay customs-duties to the Portuguese there; being hard-pressed, the ambassador from Gujarat agrees and Bassein is ceremonially handed over. But matters take a different turn shortly thereafter, with the key actor (according to Castanheda and others) being a certain João de Santiago, a Portuguese who had converted to Islam, then re-converted to Christianity, and was used as a Persian-Portuguese interpreter for Nuno da Cunha. This Santiago accompanied Shaikh ʿUwais on his return to Gujarat, but was persuaded once more to enter Bahadur's service, where he is reported to have convinced him that the Portuguese were militarily rather weak and could easily be expelled. Bahadur is hence said to have paid no heed to the clause requiring ships to put in at Bassein; nor were the Portuguese prisoners with him (men like Mesquita and Lopo Fernandes Pinto) whose release Nuno da Cunha had demanded, released at this juncture.¹⁸

In short, the cession of Bassein satisfied no-one. Bahadur may have regretted it as soon as he did it; Nuno da Cunha clearly felt that he had been short-changed in the immediate aftermath of the negotiations. But local politics still had not had their say. Shortly after signing over Bassein, Sultan Bahadur began his elaborate campaigns against Humayun. His first destination, from Mandu, was the Rajput fortress of Chitor, which he took in a campaign where the Ottoman and European artillery-specialists who were in his entourage played an important role. But this success did not last. A major engagement with Humayun now followed; the Gujarat forces were soundly defeated and Bahadur fled to Mandu, and from there (when the Mughal siege of that city began to appear ominous), to first Champaner, and eventually to Diu. We are by now in August 1535. Martim Afonso de Sousa, who is in the region, writes to Bahadur offering him aid. Nuno da Cunha, whose relations with Martim Afonso are none-too-good, seeks direct negotiations with the Sultan, and sends his own secretary, a certain Simão Ferreira, to Diu accompanied by Shaikh ʿUwais, who has meanwhile returned to Goa. As for Bahadur himself, it appears that he considered asking the Ottomans for aid in this moment of distress, and wrote letters to either the Pasha of Egypt or to Sultan Süleyman himself. In Castanheda's account, «he sent him [Süleyman] a present of jewels, arms, and rich cloths, which were valued at 600,000 cruzados, and in money to pay for the salaries of the ten or twelve thousand men that he asked him for, he sent him a million in gold, and

¹⁸ Besides the Portuguese, Sultan Bahadur also held some thirty-six French prisoners from a failed expedition that had set out from Dieppe in the late 1520s; for a letter from these Frenchmen to Lopo Vaz de Sampaio, see Luís de Matos, *Les Portugais en France au XVI^e siècle: Études et Documents*, Coimbra, 1952, pp. 225-28.

800,000 cruzados; and all these and the letters that he wrote to the Turk, he handed over to one of his principal captains whose name was Çafercão [Zafar Khan], in whom he had great confidence». This Zafar Khan, accompanied by a Portuguese renegade called Jorge, is reported to have been sent to Jiddah by ship in early September 1535, in order to make his way overland from there to Cairo.

But Ottoman help, even if it came, could not be an immediate solution.¹⁹ Bahadur thus seems to have decided to cede Diu to the Portuguese, and to hand over the Portuguese captives he had held now for some years, in a show of good faith. For his part, Humayun, at this time in the region of Champaner, seems to have opened negotiations of his own with Nuno da Cunha, also offering him Diu, and much more. These two letters apparently reached Goa via Diu at much the same time, but it was Bahadur's offer that seemed the more valid one to the Portuguese in Gujarat like Martim Afonso; after all, the Sultan still held possession of Diu. But matters were more complicated than they seemed, for internal rivalries and jockeying within the Portuguese hierarchy made for a series of misunderstandings. We have already seen that the governor, Nuno da Cunha, sought to deal directly with Bahadur through his secretary Simão Ferreira, undermining the position of Martim Afonso de Sousa, who was in Gujarat at this time, and who seems to have enjoyed excellent personal relations with Sultan Bahadur. But Sousa was no mean political actor, and he was not so easily to be robbed of a moment of glory. Eventually, it was he who negotiated the terms of the cession of Diu with Bahadur, relegating Ferreira to a somewhat secondary position. The terms of the agreement were thus set down as follows, in Castanheda's version.

«That the Çoltão Badur is pleased to cede to the King of Portugal a fortress in Diu at any spot that the governor Nuno da Cunha desires, on the side of the bulwarks facing the sea or the land, of the size that he finds acceptable, and also the sea-bulwark.

And also it pleases him to grant and confirm Baçaym with all its lands, *tanadarias*, rents and duties, as has been stated in the treaty that he made with him, concerning peace in the said Baçaym.

¹⁹ The Ottoman expedition to Diu of 1538 under Hadim Süleyman Pasha was obviously in part a response to these appeals; cf. Dejanirah Couto, 'No rasto de Hâdim Suleimão Pacha: Alguns aspectos do comércio do Mar Vermelho nos anos de 1538-1540', in Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luís Filipe F. Reis Thomaz, eds., *A Carreira da Índia e as Rotas dos Estreitos: Actas do VIII Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa*, Angra do Heroísmo, 1998, pp. 483-508. A valuable document, still poorly understood, on this expedition, is the letter from Süleyman Pasha to Ulugh Khan, *wazir* of Gujarat, dated 18 Rajab 945, or 10 December 1538, and written at Aden. The Ottoman original no longer exists; a Portuguese translation dated 7 May 1539 may be found in IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* (henceforth CC), III-14-44, reproduced with some errors in Luciano Ribeiro, 'O primeiro cerco de Dio', pp. 211-12, and more recently (with a better reading, but some lines omitted) in Dejanirah Couto, 'Les Ottomans et l'Inde Portugaise', in *Vasco da Gama e a Índia*, vol. I, Lisbon, 1999, pp. 193-94.

With the condition, that all the ships for Meca which according to the said peace-treaty were obliged to go to Baçaym are no longer to do so, but to come to Diu, as they did before; and that no force should be used against them. And when some ship wishes to go there of its own will, that it be allowed to do so: and that the same apply to others from other parts which are to be allowed to go and come wherever they wish. However, that all of them sail with *cartazes*.

And with the condition that the King of Portugal would not have duties or rents at Diu, or anything other than the said fortress and bulwarks, and that all the duties, rents, and jurisdiction over the people of the land would pertain to Çoltão Badur.

And with the condition that all the horses from Ormuz and Arabia which according to the said peace-treaty were obliged to go to Baçaim, will go to Diu, and will pay customs-duties to the King of Portugal in keeping with the custom in Goa. And if the king does not buy them, their owners can take them wherever they want.

And with the condition that all the horses that come from this side of the Straits [i.e. between the Persian Gulf and Gujarat], will not pay any duties and be exempt from them.

And with the condition that the King of Portugal and Çoltão Badur will be friends of each other's friends and enemies of each other's enemies. And the governor in the name of the King of Portugal will aid Çoltão Badur with all his power at sea and on land, and that the king will do the same for him when needed with his people and fleets.

And with the condition that if some Moors from the land of Çoltão Badur wish to become Christians, that the governor will not allow it. And that Çoltão Badur will not allow any Christian to become a Moor. And that if some person or persons who owe money to, or have goods belonging to, the King of Portugal pass over to his lands, that he will oblige them to hand them over, and that the governor will do the same if some man who has the goods of Çoltão Badur or owes him money, passes over to the Portuguese». ²⁰

The text of this treaty, negotiated between the Sultan on the one hand, and Simão Ferreira and Martim Afonso de Sousa, on the other, was accompanied by a letter from the Sultan to Nuno da Cunha, dated 28/29 September 1535, which is the first of the Persian documents at hand. It is a remarkable letter, not least of all because we possess both the Persian original (reproduced below as Document I), and a contemporary Portuguese translation, which is reproduced by Castanheda in his chronicle. Castanheda's version runs as follows.

«Nomeado do grande rey lião do mar, das agoas azuys, Nuno da Cunha, capitam mór com a merce del rey, eu vos acrecentey por amizade. Sabereys que o secretario Symão Ferreyra fiel e amado em ambas as partes e Xacoez

²⁰ Text of the treaty in Castanheda, *História*, Vol. II, Livro VIII, pp. 734-35. Compare this to the later text of a treaty signed between the viceroy D. Garcia de Noronha and Sultan Mahmud, on 6 Zu'l-Hijja 945 (A.H.), in IAN/TT, CC, III-16-9.

Atear filho do honrado vieram a mim: a vossa carta que me mandastes veo a meu estado, e vi tudo o que nela vinha escrito, quanto à vontade e desejo que tendes eu o soube claro, e antes disto Xacoez me fez saber a vossa bondade e amizade, e o soube agora por Simão Ferreira per via damizade, aquilo que vos era necessario, e que em tantos annos não se pode comprir, nem ouvereis dalcançar tam asinha hum lugar pera estarem os Portugueses aqui em Diu da banda que vos quereys, vos não ho mandastes pedir nem ho pedistes, eu vos faço merce dele com as condições que Symão Ferreyra outorgou por virtude da vossa procuração, as quaes sabereis por sua carta e per palavra de Xacoez. Agora he necessario que tanto que esta vos for dada, que nam esteys quando em nenhum lugar, e venhais aqui com Xacoez: eu tinha escrito ao capitão mor do mar, e tanto que lhe derão meu mandado logo veo a minha casa, folguey coisso, e por isso o mandey estar aqui pera me servir. Feita em Diu a vintoyto de Setembro de mil e quinhentos e trinta e cinco».²¹

The translation is for the most part accurate in its ability to convey both the contents and the tone of the letter, while not following the Persian text to the letter. This gives us a certain confidence in Castanheda's versions of other Asian diplomatic materials, even in those cases where we possess a Portuguese translation but no original. A case in point is the letter from Humayun to Nuno da Cunha that dates from August or September 1535, at any rate some time after the fall of Mandu to Mughal forces. That letter runs as follows.

«Muyto honrado, e muito senhor antre todos e a cabeça de todos, que he muyto sofrido e muyto virtuoso, e tal fama tem de muyta honrra, governador, e capitão mór Frangue, a que cato a cortesia como se fosse a pessoa del rey, ele me escreveo huma carta com seu desejo, e por seu bem, e boa amizade, que me foy dada indo ja de caminho pera offender meus contrairos sobre suas terras: e o que m'escrevestes vi logo e folguey muyto de ho ver. E aquele tempo veo muita gente de meu contrairo sobre minhas terras, então saíram alguns capitães meus a pelear coeles, e derão sobre seu arrayal, e os desbarataram todos, e forão apos eles ate junto de Mandou, matando e cativando muyta gente, os quaes como virão a minha espada fugirão todos como gente roym e civil.

Eu mandey hum pião aos capitães do Daquem, a que tinha mandado que fossem sobre as terras do meu contrairo: e lhes dissese que se viessem pera mim: sam muyto honrados, e muito grandes señores, e tem todo ho reyno do Daquem. Como chegarem a mim, conselharmey coeles, e com pouco trabalho averey meu contrairo com todas suas terras.

Os portos de mâr que me escrevestes que querieys que vos ficassem com toda a renda: os quaes eu tenho em meu poder, disso vos mando este Formão, e o que me pedis vos outorgo, porem com condição que quem quiser navegar que o possa fazer, e que viva quem quiser nesses portos

²¹ Portuguese translations in Simão Botelho, *O Tombo do Estado da Índia*, in R. J. de Lima Felner, ed., *Subsídios para a História da Índia Portuguesa*, Lisbon, 1868, pp. 219-20, and Castanheda, *História*, Vol. II, Livro VIII, p. 737.

sem receber escandalo. E de tal rey como eu aveys desperar ainda mais merces, e queria que fizeseys boa justiça em qualquer lugar que tiverdes em poder, porque minha gente que ha destar perto vos ajudará a fazela quando for necessario: e assi fará a vossa quando me comprir. E as terras que estiverem perto de vos podereis tomar, e não cureys das de longe, que tempo virá que as tomarey. E quem espera minha merce e deseja minha amizade, não digo eu darlhe os portos de mar, se não as terras firmes, e quanto eu poder, que os portos de mâr não he nada?»²²

Faced with this letter, and its almost embarrassingly generous offer of not only ports such as Diu and all their revenues, but future territories both on the coast and inland («as terras firmes»), the temptation for Cunha to try and drive a harder bargain with Sultan Bahadur was probably irresistible. But for a time, the governor chose not to show his hand.²³ Instead, arriving in Diu in October 1535 with nine hundred men, he even submitted to what to contemporary Portuguese appeared rather haughty treatment from Sultan Bahadur, who barely spoke to him at their first meeting save to ask how his journey had been («El Rey não teve outra pratica com ho governador se não preguntarlhe como hia do caminho»). Wasting no time, Cunha promptly took possession of the land where the fort was to be, and placed flags with the Portuguese arms there; a few joint military exercises, with regard to Broach and a fort in Kacch, were also planned though not put into action. Construction work on the Portuguese fort itself began in November 1535, with the governor still present.

But Bahadur's troubles were far from over. The Mughal threat still continued, as Humayun took the redoubtable fort of Champaner and began to advance towards the coast, via Ahmadabad. The Sultan hence decided to move out of Diu, while incorporating into his entourage a small group of Portuguese military auxiliaries, who included Martim Afonso de Sousa; this was an arrangement to which Nuno da Cunha agreed without too much fuss. Some time thereafter, however, Bahadur returned to Diu, and clearly began to have second thoughts about the utility of the alliance with the Portuguese. This is the moment then when he began to think of constructing a wall between the Portuguese fortress (that was itself still in the making), and the main city of Diu; this wall became a major bone of contention between him and Nuno da Cunha. Bahadur's claim was that the wall would ensure a proper separation between the two settlements, whereas some of the Portuguese saw in the wall a military venture, designed to pose a threat to the fort. It is interesting to note divisions within the Portuguese camp itself, with Martim Afonso de Sousa for instance being in favour of letting

²² Letter from Humayun to Nuno da Cunha in Castanheda, *História*, vol. II, p. 736.

²³ The true extent of Portuguese ambitions may however be seen by a treaty signed not long after Bahadur's death, in March 1537, between Nuno da Cunha and the short-lived Timurid ruler of Gujarat, Mirza Muhammad Zaman, granting Portuguese the coast from Mangrol to Bete Island, and from Daman to Bassein, for which see IAN/TT, CC, I-58-73.

the Sultan have his way. Eventually, it was Nuno da Cunha who held his ground, and this clearly annoyed Bahadur a great deal, suggesting to him that the Portuguese having been given an inch were blatantly preparing to take an ell. Even Castanheda's semi-official history suggests that the Sultan was not entirely unreasonable in sending word to the governor that «when he had made a peace-treaty with him, he had not agreed to anything more than to let him make a fortress, and that he was not subject to him, but that he now saw that he [Cunha] wished to subjugate him, since he wished to stop him from making a wall in his own territory, and that he did not honour the treaty».²⁴

None of this had any effect on Cunha, who proceeded to complete the fortress by the end of February 1536, and who eventually left Diu in the end of March that year for Bassein, leaving behind a garrison of nine hundred men, and a certain Manuel de Sousa d'Évora as captain. These are the circumstances then that explain the second and third letters of our sequence, both addressed by Sultan Bahadur to the King of Portugal, Dom João III. The first of these comes from early January 1536, when Nuno da Cunha was still in Diu, and the quarrel was simmering; it is a relatively polite and diplomatic letter, but it also makes clear the existence of substantial resentments on the part of the Sultan. This is obviously the meaning of the section of the letter which runs: «You should now ensure that the doors of correspondence remain open, and instruct the Captain-Major of India to act according to the stipulated agreement (*shart-nâma*). And he should also consider it his duty to render services to this court in such a way that there is help and cooperation. And in this matter, we should both be of one intention, and walk the road of sincerity. And the regulations that were in force [in the ceded territories] should be followed». What is still partly concealed resentment in this letter bursts into the open with full force in the third letter, also addressed to the Portuguese king, but in April 1536. After a series of initial polite formulas and greetings, the key passage runs:

«The governor had come with the Portuguese forces to aid me in person in this calamity, and I for my part had without compulsion, in order to demonstrate my sincerity, love and friendship, granted him Hisari village in the Bab-al-Kot in the region of Dib, and I had asked by way of conditions that a formal agreement (*qaul-nâma*) be written with all the specific clauses set out therein. In the meanwhile, I had to ride out [from Gujarat]. At this time, the governor wrote the *qaul-nâma* according to his own wishes, and in it he wrote down that which should not have been written and excluded that which should in fact have been put down. Now, I am still confident that the draft of this document would have been sent to you, the king, and that on reading it, you would realise that the benefits to the governor had been exaggerated, and those to myself have been minimised. In fact, even those

²⁴ Castanheda, *História*, vol. II, pp. 766-77.

[few] things that had been agreed upon are now being refused, and the governor has acted, and is acting contrary to that document. The governor has transgressed the limits and is still doing so in this matter».

In sum, Bahadur had decided that dealings with the authorities in Goa were not worth pursuing beyond a point; it was the King of Portugal who had to be apprised of the chicanery of his Asian appointees. Of some significance is a statement towards the close of the letter, where the Sultan announces his intention to visit Mecca; clearly, at this point, the military situation looked too hopeless for Bahadur, and he had decided that he would do best to absent himself for a time from Gujarat, and perhaps seek Ottoman aid in a more direct fashion than he had been able to do up to that moment.

Seven months later, when the last of our letters was written, the affairs of the Sultan had taken a dramatic turn for the better, and this is clear enough from the tone of the missive itself. In the intervening months, relations between the Portuguese garrison and the Muslim residents of the town had been none-too-good; Castanheda reports an incident in mid-June 1536, when an armed fight broke out and several Portuguese were killed. The Portuguese captain asked for the Muslims who had been in the fray to be handed over to him; but this request was denied, and mutual resentment simmered at ever higher levels. However, in the meanwhile, Bahadur's political fortunes were on the rise. Harried by troubles elsewhere, notably the Afghan challenge in the east of his empire, Humayun had been obliged to pull out of Gujarat and turn his attention to the heartland of his possessions. On 10 October 1536, the Sultan returned to Diu, with the Mughal threat now having receded to a large extent. It was a month later that he sent the last of the letters that we publish below, negotiating the return of Nuno da Cunha to Diu, to discuss matters that were still outstanding between them. We have the impression that the annoyance of the earlier letters has passed, and that relations are now on the mend.

But was this really so? Castanheda, who was particularly close to the governor, claims that the letters of invitation were really a conspiracy, as was the embassy sent to Goa, which consisted once more of Shaikh ʿUwais, and the son of Ulugh Khan, *wazīr* of Gujarat (perhaps the Nur Muhammad Khalil referred to in Document 4). In the Portuguese chronicler's view, since Bahadur was too afraid to declare open war on the Portuguese, he had «decided to capture the governor, and had him sent for, pretending that he wanted to speak with him on matters that were important for the service of the King of Portugal».²⁵ This «treason», he further declares, eventually came to be known to the Portuguese through the intervention of a Persian agent of theirs, a certain Khwaja Pir Quli («Coge Percolim»), who managed to get the ambassador from Gujarat drunk at a feast. In his drunken stupor, the

²⁵ Castanheda, *História*, vol. II, p. 816.

ambassador apparently declared that their intention was to take Nuno da Cunha prisoner by inviting him to a formal banquet when he was in Diu. In this account then, Cunha believed that Bahadur was planning to take him prisoner by means fair or foul, and his own intention when he set out for Diu in January 1537 was to forestall this by taking the Sultan prisoner first.

It is entirely possible that this account of a conspiracy was a later fabrication, to absolve Nuno da Cunha from what was after all a rather damning stain. Sultan Bahadur was not an official enemy of the Portuguese at the time of his death, and the circumstances of his drowning were highly suspicious to say the least. The sources of the conflict, which are presented in the Portuguese accounts as stemming entirely either from the Sultan's evil character traits, or from his desire to gain unreasonable leverage, appear to us to be rather more complex. Caught between the Mughal Scylla and the Portuguese Charybdis, Bahadur's instincts were to resist the one and appease the other. Yet, what he gave the Portuguese was never enough. Not Bassein, ceded in a moment of desperation, not even the right to control Diu, given at a time when things looked hopeless, and flight to Mecca was not ruled out. For the governors of the *Estado da Índia* wanted more: indeed they wanted nothing less than a territory that would be controlled on terms similar to Goa or Melaka. In order for that, Diu had to be not merely a fortress, but a full-fledged customs-house, and a conquest. In this sense, the first siege of Diu in 1538, and the transformation of a fortress that had been ceded into one that was held by the force of arms, was the logical outcome of the policies that Nuno da Cunha had in mind.²⁶ We will never know whether it was the governor's intention that Bahadur should drown in the waters off Diu on that day in February 1537. The reader of Castanheda cannot escape a feeling of suspicion even if he writes that Nuno da Cunha «when he learnt of the death of the king of Cambay, was very saddened on that account, for it seemed to him that it would have been a better affair (*melhor negócio*) had he been made prisoner».²⁷ Yet, the same chronicler assures us that «Our Lord who had mercy on the Portuguese permitted that they should kill him (...) knowing of the treason that he wished to do, and the hatred he had for the Portuguese». If regret there was at the turn that events took, it must certainly have been mixed, for the Portuguese governor and his entourage, with a sense of triumph.

²⁶ On the siege of Diu, see the materials in Luciano Ribeiro, 'O primeiro cerco de Dio', *Studia*, Vol. 1, 1958, pp. 201-271; Ribeiro, 'Preâmbulos do primeiro cerco de Diu', *Studia*, Vol. 10, 1962, pp. 151-93; and Ribeiro, 'Em torno do primeiro cerco de Diu', *Studia*, Nos. 13-14, 1964, pp. 41-104. Lopo de Sousa Coutinho, *História do primeiro cerco de Diu*, Lisbon, 1890 (first published at Coimbra, 1556).

²⁷ Nevertheless, the Portuguese did not do too badly in financial terms out of Bahadur's death. See IAN/TT, CC, I-65-94, document dated in Diu, 30 September 1539, *certidão* concerning the death of Sultan Bahadur, and evaluating the goods etc. taken after Bahadur's death at 82,929 *pardaos*. The document results from an investigation held by the *vedor da fazenda* Dr. Fernão Rodrigues de Castelo Branco on 15 September 1539, with Francisco Afonso, *contador da casa*.

Appendix: Four Letters of Sultan Bahadur

The documents reproduced here are amongst the oldest surviving chancellery and diplomatic documents from northern India.²⁸ Few original Mughal documents survive from the period of Babur or Humayun, let alone the Delhi Sultanate. However, some *farmâns* from Bahmani times in the Deccan may be found. For a discussion of the conventions of document production in the period, which is largely concerned however with the Mughals, see the work by Momin Mohiuddin, *The chancellery and Persian epistolography under the Mughals, from Bâbur to Shâh Jahân, 1526-1658: A study on Inshâ', Dâr al-Inshâ', and Munshîs based on original documents*, Calcutta: Iran Society, 1971, as also the extensive summaries of diplomatic correspondence in Riazul Islam, *A calendar of documents on Indo-Persian relations, 1500-1750*, Tehran: Iranian Culture Foundation/ Karachi: Institute of Central and West Asian Studies, 1979-1982.

The four letters we reproduce and translate are from Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/ Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Documentos Orientais collection. They are as follows:

- 1) Letter from Sultan Bahadur to Nuno da Cunha, Rabi' II 942, no. 31. (29-IX-1535, Wednesday). *Documentos Orientais* No. 31.
- 2) Letter from Sultan Bahadur to Dom João III, dated 7 Rajab 942, no. 17. (unsigned). (1-I-1536, Sunday). *Documentos Orientais* No. 17. The document has no seal. From the contents the letter is obviously from the Sultan of Gujarat to the King of Portugal, Dom João III. This letter is more formal than Doc. 1 in terms of language, and is in elegant Naskh script. It ends with stylised dates, in an Arabicised language.
- 3) Letter from Sultan Bahadur to Dom João III, dated 25 Shawwal 942, no. 30. (17-IV-1536, Tuesday). *Documentos Orientais* No. 30. The letter is written in cursive *tâliq* script.
- 4) Letter from Sultan Bahadur to Nuno da Cunha, dated 3 Jumada II 943, no. 8. (17-XI-1536, Friday). *Documentos Orientais* No. 8. The letter is written on behalf of the Sultan of Gujarat to the Captain-Major, but it lacks the royal seal, and only has that of the royal secretariat. This letter, unlike the earlier one, never uses the first person.

²⁸ Cf. the relatively complete list of such documents in Portuguese collections in Georg Schurhammer, 'Orientalische Briefe aus der Zeit des Hl. Franz Xaver (1500-1552)', *Euntes docete*, vol. XXI, 1968, pp. 255-301, which however does not include three of our four letters.

Documento 1

Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, , no. 31, 1 Rabi II 942 H. (29 September 1535).

Sultan Bahadur Shah to Nuno da Cunha

Seal:

شاه سپهر کوكبه سلطان بهادر است ، شاهى كه مهر خاتمش از مهر خور
در است.

Text:

مَشْهُورُ الْحَضْرَةِ الْأَعْلَى أَسَدُ الْبَحْرِ الْخَضِرَاءِ نُونِدُ كُونِيَا كَيْتَانِ مَوْرٍ، بِمِرَاحِمِ
خَسْرَوَانِهِ وَفِرَطِ عَوَاطِفِ بَادِدِشَاهَانِهِ مَفْتَخِرٍ وَسِرَافِرَازِ گَشْتِه، مَعْلُومِ نَمَائِدِ:
مُعْتَمَدِ الْحَضْرَتَيْنِ سَيْمَا فَرِيرِ سَكْرَتَارِ مَصْحُوبِ نَتِيجَةِ الْاَكَابِرِ كَمَالِ الدِّينِ
أُوَيْسِ شَيْخِ اخْتِيَارِ بِشَرَفِ بَسَاطِ بُوَسَى بَارِگَاهِ عَالِيْجَاهِ سِرَافِرَازِ گَشْتِ،
وَعَرِيضِهِ اَوْبِيْشِ پَايِهِ سَرِيْرِ خِلَافَتِ مَصِيْرِعَزِ عَرْضِ يَافْتِ، وَپِرْتُوِ اِطْلَاقِ بَرِ
مُضْمُونِ اِخْلَاصِ مَشْحُونِ اَنْ تَافْتِ. اَنْچِه وَظَايِفِ خِدْمَتْگَارِي وَجَانْسِيْپَارِي
بَازِ نَمُودِه بُوْدِه، بُوَضُوحِ پِيُوَسْتِ. قَبْلِ اَزِيْنِ هَمِ دَوْلَتْخَوَاهِي اَنْ مَشْهُورِ الْحَضْرَةِ
اَزِ مُضْمُونِ عَرَايِضِ شَيْخِ مَشَارِ اَلِيْهِ بَتَوَاتِرِ پِيُوَسْتِه بُوْدِ. بَازِ دَرِيْنِ وَقْتِ اَزِ
تَقْرِيْرِ سَيْمَا فَرِيْرِ مَوْمِي اَلِيْهِ وَاضِحِ بَرِگَشْتِ. بِنَاءِ عَلِيْهِ اَنْچِه مَطْلُوبِ اَوْبُوْدِ
حِصُولِ اَنْ بِسَالْهَآ اَسَانِ نَمِي نَمُودِ، يَعْني مَحَلِّيْ جِهَتِ سَكُونَتِ بَعْضِي اَزِ اَهْلِ
پِرْتِگَالِ هَمِ اَزِ اَنْطِرْفِ كِه مَدْعَاءِ اِيْشَانِ بُوْدِ، بَغِيْرِ طَلْبِ وَالتَّمَاْسِ اَنْ مَشْهُورِ
الْحَضْرَةِ مَرْحَمَتِ فَرْمُودِيْمِ، مَشْرُوطِ وَموَكَّدِ بِشَرَايِطِ چِنْدِ كِه سَيْمَا فَرِيْرِ مَوْمِي
اَلِيْهِ بُوَكَالَتِ اَنْ مَشْهُورِ الْحَضْرَةِ قَبُوْلِ نَمُودِه. تَفْصِيْلِ اَنْ اَزِ تَحْرِيْرِ سَيْمَا فَرِيْرِ
وَازِ تَقْرِيْرِ شَيْخِ مَشَارِ اَلِيْهَمَا مَعْلُومِ گَرْدِدِ. اَكْنُونِ مِي بَايِدِكِه بَعْدِ وَصُوْلِ فَرْمَانِ
اَعْلَى بِي تَوْقِفِ وَاهْمَالِ بِمِصَاحِبَتِ شَيْخِ مَشَارِ اَلِيْهِ مَتَوَجَّهْ اَنْحَضْرَتِ شُوْدِ. وَ
چُونِ كَيْتَانِ مَوْرِ سَرْدَارِ دَرِيَا بِمَجْرِدِ وَصُوْلِ فَرْمَانِ مَتَوَجَّهْ دَرِگَاهِ عَالِيِ شُدِ،
پَسَنْدِيْدِه اَمْدِ، وَدَرِيْنِ حَضْرَتِ دَاشْتِه شُدِه تَا شَرَايِطِ خِدْمَتْگَارِي بَتَقْدِيْمِ رَسَانْدِ.
تَمَّ ١. مَاهِ رَبِيْعِ الْاَخْرَسَنَةِ ٩٤٢.

English translation of Document no. 1:

Seal: The king of the glittering sky full of stars is Sultan Bahadur, the king the seal of whose signet ring draws brilliance from the sun.²⁹

Text:

The exalted and noted Lion of the Green Ocean (*asad al-bahr al-khazra*), Nuno da Cunha, Captain-Major (*kaptân mûr*), honoured with the privilege of royal attention, may it be known to him, that our mutual confidant Simão Ferreira, secretary, is present here accompanied by Kamal-ud-Din °Uwais Shaikh Ikhtiyar, having had the honour of kissing the threshold of these high-statured portals. Your letter was presented before the feet of the throne that is the refuge of the Caliphate. We came to know of the sincerity-laden contents of this letter. Whatever you had written about your services and loyalty was noted. Earlier too, we had come to know of your loyalty from the letters of the said Shaikh. Now, once more, it became further established from the address of Simão Ferreira. What you had desired and not received for years, that is a place for some of the people of Portugal to reside, and which had again been the aim (*mudda°â*) of this letter, we grant you this [herewith] without your formal request on some conditions which Simão Ferreira as your representative (*wakîl*) has accepted. You will learn the details from his letter and also verbally from the said Shaikh. Now, after having received our high *farmân*, you should come to present yourself without any delay, accompanied by the said Shaikh. And it was appreciated when the captain-major, chief of the seas (*sardâr-i daryâ*) set out for the exalted court on receiving our *farmân*. He is staying here, so that he can render services (*khidmatgâri*) to us. Dated 1st (?) Rabi II 942».

²⁹ This document and Doc. 30 have a common seal. Our reading is: «Shâh-i Sipîhr-i kaukaba Sultân Bahâdur ast/ shâhi ke muhr-i khwâtamash az mehr dar khwur ast». Aubin's draft translation differs, and he proposes, «Le roi du firmament, c'est la constellation de Sultan Bahadur/ Le prince dont le cachet de son sceau est convenable pour le soleil». Castanheda, *História*, Vol. II, Livro VIII, p. 729 has another version of the seal that seems to us rather fantastic: «Ho Çoltão Badur cadeyra está nos ceos, e ho sol he seu selo, e a lua serradura do seu cavalo, e as estrelas cravos dela».

Documento 2

Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, *Documentos Orientais*, no. 17, 7 Rajab 942 (1 January 1536).

Sultan Bahadur Shah to the King of Portugal

Text:

بِسْمِ الْأَسْمَى سُبْحَانَهُ

مُبَارِزِ الدَّوْلَةِ وَالرَّفْعَةِ وَالْإِقْبَالِ رَايِ دَوَانِجَوَانِ بَادِشَاهِ پَرْتِگَالِ شَيْدَاللَّهِ تَعَالَى
بِنِيَانِ دَوْلَتِهِ وَرَفْعَتِهِ وَاقْبَالِهِ فِي الْإِزْمَانِ. اَزِينِ جَانِبِ قَوَافِلِ دَعَوَاتِ مَسْكِيهِ
التَّفْحَاتِ وَرَوَاجِلِ مَدْحَاتِ وَرَدِيَّةِ الْفُوحَاتِ مَطَالَعِهِ نَمَائِنْدِ. مَا هُوَ الْمَقْصُودُ أَنْكَه
قَبْلَ اَزِينِ بَا عُمْدِهِ حُكَّامِ النَّصَارَى نُونِدِ كُونِيَانِ كَيْتَانِ مَوْرِ گُورِنْدُولِ بُوكَالْتِ
أَنْ عَظِيمِ الشَّانِ مَصَالِحْتِ اخْتِيَارِ افْتَادِهِ [؟] خَطَّهُ بِسَهِينِ رَا بَا مَنْسُوبَاتِ
وَمَحْصُولَاتِ تَسْلِيمِ فَرْمُودِهِ شَدِيدِ بُوْدِ. وَچُونِ دَرِينِ وَلَا آثَارِ وَثُوقِ وَعَهْدِ وَپِيْمَانِ
وَخِدْمَاتِ اخْلَاصِ نِشَانِ مَشَاهِدِهِ افْتَادِ، مَوْضِعِ حِصَارِیِ اَزِ بَابِ الْكُوتِ خَطَّهُ
دِيْبِ بَا قَلْعِهِ مِيَانِ آبِ وَ دُوقَلْعِهِ كِهْ مَتَعَلِقِ بِخَطِّهِ بِسَهِينِ بُوْدِ وَنَدَادِهِ بُوْدِيْمِ ،
بَانَ پَادِشَاهِ كَبِيْرِ اَرْزَانِي دَاشْتِيْمِ . اَكْنُونِ چِنَانِ كَنْنِدِ كِهْ پِيُوْسْتِهْ اِبْوَابِ
مَرَاْسَلَاتِ مَفْتُوْحِ بَاشِدِ. وَكَيْتَانِ مَوْرَانِ هِنْدِ رَا اِشَارَتِ نَمَائِنْدِ كِهْ بِمَوْجِبِ
شَرْطِنَامِهِ كِهْ مَقْرَرَاْسْتِ عَمَلِ نَمُودِهِ، وَخِدْمَاتِ اَيْنِ دَرْگَاهِ رَا وَاجِبِ شَمْرَدِهِ،
طَرِيْقِهِ مَعَاوَنْتِ وَمَظَاهِرْتِ بَظْهَوْرِ رَسَانَنْدِ. وَدَرِينِ بَابِ يَكْجِهْتِ بُوْدِهِ جَادِهِ
اِخْلَاصِ مَسْلُوكِ گَرْدَانَنْدِ وَبِرِ حَكْمِ مَعِيْنِ جَارِيِ دَارَنْدِ. اَمَّا چِيْزِي كِهْ اَزَانِ نَتِيْجِهْ
مِصَالِحِهِ مَجْدِدًا ظَاهِرِ مِي گَرْدِدِ اَزِ نُوْشْتِهْ گُورِنْدُولِ بُوْضُوْحِ خَوَاهِدِ پِيُوْسْتِ .
فِي السَّابِعِ مِنْ شَهْرِ رَجَبِ الْمُرْجَبِ عَمَّتْ بَرَكَاتُهُ ، سَنَةِ اثْنَيْنِ وَأَرْبَعِينَ وَتِسْعِمِائَةَ
الْهَجْرَةِ النَّبَوِيَّةِ عَلَيْهِ شَرَايِفُ التَّحِيَّةِ الْأَبَدِيَّةِ السَّرْمَدِيَّةِ .

English translation of Document no. 2:

Notation at top right: *Bi-Isimih'il Asmâ Subhânahu* («In His Name who is High, Glory be to Him !»).

Text:

Commander of the state (*mubâriz ud-daula*) and of exalted heights and fortune, Rey Don João King of Portugal, may God strengthen the foundations of your state and height and fortune for ages. May I present you this letter that carries caravans of prayers with pleasant fragrance, and people with rose-coloured praises. The purpose of this letter is to state the following: That earlier, following the truce with the best of the governors of the Christians, Nuno da Cunha, captain-major and governor, representative of you, high-statured [ruler], I had conferred a fort in the territory (*khitta*) of Bassein along with its appurtenances and revenues; and as in the meanwhile I have [further] noted the marks of the cementing of our close collaboration and the sincere services [of your men], I am now generously bestowing on you, great king, the village Hisari (?) from the territory (*bâb*) of Kut in the region (*khitta*) of Dib, along with the fort in the middle of the water, and two other forts belonging to the region of Bassein that I had not granted earlier. You should now ensure that the doors of correspondence remain open, and instruct the Captain-Major of India (*kaptân-i mûrân-i Hind*) to act according to the stipulated agreement (*shart-nâma*). And he should also consider it his duty to render services to this court (*dargâh*) in such a way that there is help and cooperation. And in this matter, we should both be of one intention, and walk the road of sincerity. And the regulations that were in force [in the ceded territories] should be followed. And those things which your governor has submitted afresh towards peace and cooperation will be clear from his letters to you. 7 Rajab 942 Hijri».

Documento 3

Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, *Documentos Orientais*, no. 30, 25 Shawwal 942
(17 April 1536).

Sultan Bahadur Shah to the King of Portugal

Seal:

شاه سپهر کوبه سلطان بهادر است ، شاهی که مهر خاتمش از مهر خور
در است.

Text:

بِسْمِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ

مبارز السلطنة والإيالة والدولة والإقبال رای دوانجان بادشاه پرتغال شیدالله
تعالی بنیان دولته . بعد از تبلیغ مدحات مسکيه الفوحات وتحيات وردية
النفحات انها، آنکه بر ذوی العقول پوشیده نماید که بادشاهی مبراً از وصمت
تغیر و انتقال حصرة الجلال را سزاوار است. وسلطنت هر مخلوق اگرچه
دیرپا باشد، عرصه تبدل وزوال خواهد ... ومرتبه هر يك از ایشان در طبقات
استیلا واستعلا وقدرة ومكنت وقوت وشوکت. وتطرق حوادث ونوايب
روزگار خصوصاً درین آوان بر ممالک هندوستان سیما گجرات ، بر بادشاهی
که کشتی شوکت واقتدارش در دریاء محیط وفرنگ وهند جاری است ، چگونه
مخفی ماند. ثانیاً ، ما هو المرام آنکه بعد از آنکه انشاءخونق وداد و اخلاص
حامی شده ، گورندور درین حادثه با عساکر پرتغال جهت امداد واعانت آمده
بجد ایستادگی نمودند. واین حضرت بنا بر توضیح بیان خلت و مودت وظهور
دلایل محبت و خلوصیت بطوع و رغبت موضع حصاری از باب الكوت خطه
دیب بگورند ورتسلیم فرمودند، مشروط بانکه قولنامه بنویسند و تمام
شرایط مقررہ معینه درانجا درج نمایند. ودران ولا ما بسواری برون رفتیم،

English translation of Document 3:

Seal: The king of the glittering sky full of stars is Sultan Bahadur, the king
the seal of whose signet ring draws brilliance from the sun.

Notation at top right: *Bi-Ismih'il Asmâ Subhânahu* («In His Name who is
High, Glory be to Him !»).

Text:

Commander of the State, Governance, Sultanate and Fortune, Rey
Don João, King of Portugal. May God strengthen the foundation of your
state. After sending you fragrant wishes and prayers etc. It is not hidden
from people of intelligence that kingship free from changes and transfor-
mation behoves only the Almighty who possesses stature and wrath. And
the Sultanate of his creatures, even if it lasts for long, must change, and
decline inevitably sets in [...]. The position of kings varies on account of
their power, control, strength and éclat. Further, how can the calamities and
unfortunate occurrences of the time, particularly those of the countries of
Hindustan, that is Gujarat (*mamâlik-i Hindustân siyima Gujarât*), be
concealed from a person, the ship of whose power and strength plies the
circumscribing ocean (*daryâ-i muhît*), and those of Firang and Hind.
Besides, to come to the purpose of the letter, the foundations of friendship
and trust had been laid between the two of us; the governor had come with
the Portuguese forces to aid me in person in this calamity (*hâdisa*), and I
for my part had without compulsion, in order to demonstrate my sincerity,
love and friendship, granted him Hisari village in the Bab-al-Kot in the
region of Dib, and I had asked by way of conditions that a formal agreement
(*qaul-nâma*) be written with all the specific clauses set out therein. In the
meanwhile, I had to ride out [from Gujarat]. At this time, the governor
wrote the *qaul-nâma* according to his own wishes, and in it he wrote down
that which should not have been written and excluded that which should in
fact have been put down. Now, I am still confident that the draft of this
document would have been sent to you, the king, and that on reading it, you
would realise that the benefits to the governor had been exaggerated, and
those to myself have been minimised. In fact, even those [few] things that
had been agreed upon are now being refused, and the governor has acted,
and is acting contrary to that document. The governor has transgressed the
limits and is still doing so in this matter. No representative of a king has ever
been able to do such a thing without the agreement of his master. And if it
is in keeping with his master's wishes that he has written such a document,
then where can I go to complain about such a great king (*bâdshâh-i buzurg*)?
I cannot say anything about what he has done, on account of my own

ایشان قولنامه بمدعاء خود نوشتند. چنانچه بسیار نوشتنیها را گذاشته و نا نوشتنیها را نگاشتند. و خاطر ما بان جمع است که سواد آن بانجانب فرستاده اند وبعد از استماع معلوم خواهند نمود که در هر چه فایده ایشان است، چه مبالغها کرده، و هرچه مارافایده است، اختصار کرده اند. و اگرچه بسیار چیزها دران مندرج اند که بران عمل نمی کنند، بلکه خلاف آن ظاهر ساخته اند و می سازند. گورندور چنانچه تعدی درین باب کرده و می کنند. وکیل هیچ بادشاه را قدرت نبوده و نیست که بی رضاء صاحب چنین عمل کند. و اگر برضاء صاحب بوده باشد، پس شکایت چنین بادشاه بزرگ پیش که کرده شود. و این سخنان که ازو بما رسیده از شرم ما نیز[؟] نمی توان گفت. همایون از مابهمین قدر راضی است که ما نام صلح بر زبان بگذرانیم و او ولایت گذاشته برود. ما ازوقبول نمی کنیم... ما را ازین کسان سخنان باید شنید و تحمل باید کرد. اما خاطر ما به کلی جمع است که آن بادشاه تفحص شافی خواهند نمود وبعد از تحقیق انتقام از گورندور خواهند کشند. اما در باب قولنامه بهر طریق که آن بادشاه ذ و جاه خود بنویسانیده ارسال کرده اند، ما را همان قبول است. امسال نیت مکّه مشرفه داریم. قولنامه که می فرستند، بمتعلقان ما که در خطّه دیب اند، خواهد رسید که ایشان پیش ما بفرستند و عمل بران خواهد نمود. فی خامس عشرین شهر شوآل ختم بالسعادة والاقبال. سنه ۹۴۲ الهجرى النبوی المصطفوی صلعم.

diffidence. Humayun is willing to leave the country if only I am willing to state that I accept peace, but I have decided not to accept this [...]. We must listen to each other patiently, but in any case my heart is fully confident that you will investigate this completely, and as a result reprimand the governor on my account for all this. As for the *qaul-nâma*, whatever Your Excellency writes himself could be sent to me, and I shall accept it. This year, I am intending to go to Holy Mecca. The *qaul-nâma* that you send will be received by my officials (*muta'lliqân*) in the region of Div, so that they may send it on to me for its putting into effect. Written on 25 Shawwal, the month with the mark of virtue and fortune, in the year 942».

Document 4

Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, *Documentos Orientais*, no. 8, 3 Jumada II 943 (17 September 1535).

Sultan Bahadur Shah to Nuno da Cunha

Seal:

سکه دبیر خانه.

Text:

مَشْهُورِ الْحَضْرَةِ الْأَعْلَى أَسَدِ الْبَحْرِ الْخَضِرَاءِ وَرَنْدُولِ اعْظَمِ نُونُودِ كُونِيَا كَيْتَانِ
مُورٍ، بِعِنَايَةِ لَا نَهَائِيَةِ پَادِشَاهِي عَزِ اِخْتِصَاصِ يَافْتِهِ، مَعْلُومِ نَمَايِدِ: عَرِيضُهُ أَنْ
مَشْهُورِ الْحَضْرَةِ دَرِ پَا يِه سَرِيرِ خَلَاْفَتِ مَصِيْرِ عَزَّ عَرْضِ يَافْتِ وَ پَرْتُو اِطْلَاعِ بِرِ
مُضْمُونِ أَنْ تَافْتِ. أَنْجِه دَرِ بَابِ خَدْمَتْگَارِي وَ جَانَسِيْپَارِي نَسْبِتِ بِمَلَاْزِمَانِ
دَرگَاهِ خَلَاْفَتِ پَنَاهِ مَعْرُوضِ بُوْدِ، مَسْتَحْسِنِ اِفْتَادِ. بِنَا بَرَانِ مَقْرَبِ الْحَضْرَةِ
الْأَعْلَى نُورِ مُحَمَّدِ خَلِيْلِ فَرَسْتَادِه شُدِ. كَيْفِيَّتِ وَحَالَاتِ اَيْنِ نَوَاحِي اِعْلَامِ خَوَاهدِ
نَمُودِ. أَنْ مَشْهُورِ الْحَضْرَةِ دَائِمِ دَوْلَتْخَوَاهِ وَ يَكْجِهَتِ اَيْنِ دَرگَاهِ عَالِيْجَاهِ اِسْتِ. بَايِدِ
كِه طَرِيْقِه دَوْلَتْخَوَاهِي نَسْبِتِ بَا نَوَابِ كَامِيَابِ نَوْعِي مَسْلُوكِ وَ مَرْعِي دَارِدِ كِه
مَوْجِبِ اَزْدِيَادِ عِنَايَتِ شَفَقَتِ گَرْدِدِ. وَ دَرِ بَابِ مَتَوْجِهِ شَدْنِ أَنْ مَشْهُورِ الْحَضْرَةِ
عَرْضِ نَمُودِ. فَرْمُودِه مِي آيِدِ كِه خَاطِرِ اَشْرَفِ اَزتَوْجِهِ او بَدِيْنِ حَضْرَتِ بَسِي
مَنْشَرَحِ اِسْتِ. بَايِدِ كِه بَتَعْجِيْلِ مَتَوْجِهِ گَرْدِدِ، چِه عِنْقَرِيْبِ طَلُوعِ كُوكْبِه عِظْمَتِ
بِجَانِبِ قَلْعِه چِيْتُورِ مَصْمَمِ اِسْتِ. فِي يَوْمِ السَّبْتِ ثَالِثِ شَهْرِ جُمَادِي الْاُخْرَى
سَنَةِ ثَلَاثِ وَ اَرْبَعِيْنِ وَ تِسْعِمَاةِ.

English translation of Document 4:

Seal of the Secretariat: *Sikka-i dabîr khâna*.

Text:

The exalted and noted Lion of the Green Ocean, the great governor (*warandûl a'zam*), Nuno da Cunha, Captain-Major (*kaptân mûr*), privileged especially with limitless royal kindness, may it be known to you that your letter was received at the feet of the throne that is the refuge of the Caliphate (*dar pâya-i sarîr khilâfat masîr*), and its contents came to be known. Whatever you had written of your loyalty and services in relation to the court that is the shelter of the Caliphate (*dargâh-i khilâfat panâh*) was noted and appreciated. One of our close confidants, Nur Muhammad Khalil has been sent, from whom you would gather the conditions in these parts. You, noted one, are ever a well-wisher of the state and of this high-statured court (*dargâh-i 'âlîjâh*). In view of the expression of your good wishes, your treatment of this representative should [now] be such as to cause my kindness and affection towards you to grow. As for your request to come here, you are hereby informed that His Highness's heart has been gladdened by this expression of intention. You should immediately set out, because it has been decided that soon the Star of Greatness (*kaukaba-i 'azmat*) shall rise in the direction of the fort of Chittor. Written on Saturday 3 Jumada II 943.

باینده...

مبارک الله الذی هدانا لهذا الذی کنا لنکون لیه قائلین... شیدانه عالی بنیان دولت و رحمته و افاضه...

تواند عوارض نیکه الفحاحات و رواج ملجعات و دردی لغزعات طالع نماید... ماهی انفس و انکفیل ازین سخن حکما لفظا...

نیز که کونان کستان و زکوزد و کذا... انظیر الشان... انکفیل ازین سخن حکما لفظا...

و چون درین و لا امار و توفیق و پیمان و خدمات خلاص نشان مشاهده افاد... موضع جھاری نایب الکتوت خط و بی...

باقله میان آب و در قلم که تعلق بخطه بیج بود و نداد... بودیم بان یاد شاکر از اول داشتیم... اکون چنان کذا...

ابواب رسالت معشوق باشد و کتمان و دران هنده... انما یذکره من جمل منقرت عین منور و خدمات...

این درگاه را واجبش برده... مطابقت ظهور رسانند و درین باب نکته بود... اخلاص اولی که در این...

و بر حکم عین جاری دارند... انما یذکره من جمل منقرت عین منور و خدمات...

و الساج من شهر رجب المرجب... انما یذکره من جمل منقرت عین منور و خدمات...



مشهور المحضرت الاعلیٰ احمد البحر المحضری و در جدول اعظم نونوز و کربان کسرتان مور...

لانها بیت پادشاهی غرض خاص یافته معلوم نماید عرضیه... در باب سر خلافت...

بجز عرض یافته که در خواص... انچه در باب خردکاری و جاس پارسی نسبت...

بلا بیان و کلاه... انچه در باب خردکاری و جاس پارسی نسبت...

بلا بیان و کلاه... انچه در باب خردکاری و جاس پارسی نسبت...

دایم در دستخواه و یکجمله این درگاه عالیجا است... باید که طریقه در خواصی نسبت بانوارت...

نوع مسلوک و مرجع دارد که موجب از دیاد عنایت و محقق گردد... در باب متوجه...

شدن امور المحضرت عرض نموده بود فرموده می آید که تمام اشرف از توجه او... در باب متوجه...

بسی منشرح است باید که بتعمیل متوجه گردد... طریقه در خواصی نسبت بانوارت...

قلم چیتور مصمم است فی بوم السبت ثالث شهر جمادی الثانی... در باب متوجه...

Vertical marginal note in Persian script.

