

SPATIALIZATION AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING: ROLE OF THE CITIES OF COCHIN AND GOA IN SHAPING THE *ESTADO DA ÍNDIA*, 1500-1663

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Cochin and Goa, which evolved as two parallel urban units on the West Coast of Índia, played a significant role in the structuring and functioning of the *Estado da Índia*, by ensuring not only the process of resource mobilization but also the process of consolidation. A great amount of European challenges of this period were being ably responded by the *Estado da Índia* using the instrumentality of these two cities, whose multiple functions within the *Estado* were shaped not only by their geo-physical location and their closeness/distance to power centre but also by their ability to mobilize resources. Though the early beginnings of the Portuguese city of Santa Cruz of Cochin were linked with its position as being the first headquarters of the *Estado da Índia*, its development as a major urban unit of Asia took place after 1530, with the shifting of the capital to Goa. The relative distance from the power center of Goa favoured the prevalence of a liberal atmosphere in Cochin both in its trading activities as well as in its process of urban development, which ultimately influenced its pattern of spatialization and its social dynamics, as well. However Goa, which developed as an urban unit experiencing the pressure from the core center of power exercise, exhibited another type of spatialization and urban development, pulled by the dynamics of the power exercising institutions.

Standardization was effected in all spheres related to city life and administration, with the introduction of municipalities in Cochin and Goa, which in fact acted as devices that legitimately exteriorized and implemented the aspirations and desires of their urban elites. Though the interests of the city-dwellers

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at times went on parallel lines to those of the *Estado*, the latter developed strategies and devices to get their resources pooled and their interests channelized for meeting the greater interests of the State in times of external challenges, whose end result was the evolution of the best supportive system conceivable at that time, out of these cities. In this process, the Municipal councils acted as mechanisms that were involved in the process of constructing continual urban space, in which were embedded both the aspirations of the urban elites and the multiple needs of the *Estado*.

Many historical geographers and historians argue that the spatial processes involved in the construction of the urban units can be analyzed and studied to decode the intentions of the human agents and the extent of their realizations.¹ This type of study emerges from the assumption that "space", particularly urban space, is intentionally charged with meaning and is consequently used for the purpose of influencing not only the organization and operation of the society but also the behaviour of its members. The central purpose of this paper is to see the different mechanisms and processes by which the *Estado da Índia* structured and organized the urban space of Cochin and Goa for the purpose of consolidating its far-flung possessions and for ably responding to the diverse challenges it faced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is attempted, on the one hand, by analyzing the spatial manifestations of the city of Cochin as shaped by the dynamics of its trade and also of Goa, as conditioned by the dynamics of its power exercising institutions, besides trade. On the other hand it also tries to examine the extent to which the ability of these cities as resource mobilizing mechanisms was banked upon.

Historical Setting

The nuclei for the urban units of Cochin and Goa appeared tentatively around the same time, though at different places and due to different historical reasons. The initial phase of the urban life of Cochin is attributed to its trade that

¹ The most important among them are Alan Baker, *Geography and History: Bridging the Divide*, Cambridge, 2003; David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, Baltimore, 1973; David Harvey, *Spaces of Capital*, Oxford, 2001; Derek Gregory, "The Production of Space" in R. J. Johnson et al. (eds.), *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, Oxford, 2000, pp. 644-646; see also F. Broeze (ed.), *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, Honolulu, 1995 and F. Broeze (ed.), *Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th-20th Centuries*, 1996; Ashin Das Gupta, "The Maritime City" in *Merchants of Maritime India, 1500-1800*, 1994. For Goa as a port city, cf. M. N. Pearson, "The Port City of Goa: Policy and Practice in the Sixteenth Century", in *Coastal Western India*, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 67-92; W. Rossa, *Cidades indo-portuguesas: contribuições para o estudo do urbanismo português no Hindustão Ocidental/ Indo-Portuguese Cities: A Contribution to the Study of Portuguese Urbanism in the Western Hindustan*, Lisboa, 1997; C. R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770*, The Hague, 1948; George

began with its emergence as a port following the geo-physical changes caused by the great flood in Periyar 1341 A.D.² While the floodwaters that moved through the northern branch of the river silted up the harbour of Cranganore, the heavy flow of floodwaters through the southern branches of the river opened up a passage from the lagoon into the sea, bringing into existence the harbour of Cochin.³ In the evolving process, Cochin served as a door for the rich and extensive spice-hinterland of central Kerala to get connected with the wider circuit of Indian Ocean trade, the spatial limits of which were defined by such merchant communities of Cochin as the Muslims linked with the West Asian trade, the Kelings linked with South East Asian commerce, the Chetties associated with the coastal trade of Coromandel as well as Canara⁴ and the Jews conducting business mostly through the Semitic Diasporas scattered in Europe and Egypt.⁵ Though these long stretches of spice-hinterland were politically divided and fragmented by different petit kingdoms, they were economically so well integrated with the port of Cochin through frequent movement of commodities and established links of exchange that they together formed one economic unit feeding the commercial activities of Cochin.⁶

However, the emergence of Cochin as a port and its consequent carving out of the spice-hinterland in the vicinity for its feeding, disturbed the existing

Bryan Souza, "Iberian Cities and Colonial Cities in the Tropics: Imperial Defense and Finance and the *Senado da Câmara* of Cochin, 1587-1598", a paper presented at the International Institute of Asian Studies, Leiden, 2003.

² W. W. Hunter, *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. IV, London, 1885, p. 11; K. Rama Varma Raja, "The Cochin Harbour and the Puthu Vaippu Era" in *The Bulletin of the Rama Varma Research Institute* 2, (1933), pp. 49-51.

³ K. M. Panikkar, *A History of Kerala (1498-1801)*, Annamalaiagar, 1960, p. 8; K. P. Padmanabha Menon, *History of Kerala*, vol. I, Ernakulam, 1929, p. 161; W. W. Hunter, *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. IV, London, 1885, p. 11; C. Achyuta Menon, *The Cochin State Manual*, Ernakulam, 1911, p. 2.

⁴ In 1409 Ma Huan noticed the active presence of Muslim merchants, Chetties and Kelings (Klings or Kalingas linked with South East Asian commerce) in Cochin. Ma Huan, *Ying Yai Sheng lan* 12, "Kochih", as translated by W. W. Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations and Trade of China with Eastern Archipelago and the Coast of the Indian Ocean during the fourteenth century" in *T'oung Pao*, Leiden, 1915, vol. XVI, pp. 450-451.

⁵ Visscher says that the process of migration of white Jews from Cranganore to Cochin (exactly to Senhora Soude, almost two kilometers away from Cochin) began in 1471. However it was only by 1521-1523 that these white Jews finally shifted their residence completely to Cochin. See Letters of Visscher from Kerala, in K. P. Padmanabha Menon, *History of Kerala*, vol. II, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 51, 517; Pius Malekandathil, "The Jews of Cochin and the Portuguese: 1498-1663", p. 241.

⁶ Pius Malekandathil, "The Portuguese and the Ghat-Route Trade: 1500-1663", in *The Journal of Poudicherry*, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, vol. 1, nos 1 & 2, January & July, 2000, pp. 132-50.

resource mobilizing process of Calicut in the hinterland and raised serious challenges to the control that the Zamorin exercised over the vast range of spice-producing hinterland. However, the Zamorin had at his disposal the monetary and military help being extended by the Muslim mercantile community, with which he eventually managed to conquer Cochin and convert it into a feeding satellite center for Calicut.⁷ In the changed situation the *paradesi* Muslim merchants and particularly the Al-Karimi merchants linked with the Mamluks of Egypt, took up the overseas trade of Malabar and the transshipment of commodities from Calicut to the Red Sea ports. Meanwhile, a major segment of the coastal trade of Malabar passed on into the hands of the Marakkar Muslim merchants of Coromandel, out of whom many eventually preferred to establish themselves in Cochin as distributors of Coromandel rice and as traders in spices from Kerala.⁸

Meanwhile the port of Ela, out of which the Portuguese city of Goa later evolved, made its appearance on the banks of river Mandovi in the Southern Konkan probably as a satellite port feeding Gopakapattanam, the principal port of the Kadambas.⁹ Later when the Vijayanagara rulers conquered this region

⁷ Cochin was made a satellite feeding port of Calicut by the end of the fifteenth century when the Zamorin captured Cochin and ousted the traditional traders from the port including the *Nazarenos* (the St. Thomas Christians) and handed over its trade to the Muslim traders from Calicut, a process by which he won a decisive say over the affairs of Cochin. O. K. Nambiar, *The Kunjalis, Admirals of Calicut*, Delhi, 1963, p. 40; K. P. Padmanabha Menon, *History of Kerala*, vol. I, p. 167.

⁸ For details see O.K.Nambiar, *The Kunjalis...*, p. 76. For detailed discussion on the Muslims of Kerala see Genevieve Bouchon, "Les Musulmans du Kerala a L'Époque de La Decouverte Portugaise" in *Mare Luso-Indicum*, tom. II, Paris, 1973, pp. 1-54; Geneviève Bouchon, "Calicut at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century" in *The Asian Seas 1500-1800: Local Societies, European Expansion and the Portuguese*, *Revista de Cultura*, vol. I, ano V, 1991, p. 42; W. J. Fischel, "The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt" in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. I (1958), pp. 162-163; S. D. Goitein, "New Light on the Beginnings of the Karim Merchants" in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. I (1958) p. 181; Pius Malekandathil, "From Merchant Capitalists to Corsairs: The Response of the Muslim Merchants of Malabar to the Portuguese Commercial Expansion (1498-1600)" in *Portuguese Studies Review*, vol. 12, I (Nov. 2004). For details see Gaspar Correia, *Lendas da India*, tom. I, Lisboa, 1921, pp. 428-430; tom. II, p. 722; Jorge Manuel Flores, "The Straits of Ceylon and the Maritime Trade in Early Sixteenth Century India: Commodities, Merchants and Trading Networks", in *Moyen Orient and Ocean Indien, XVI^e-XIX^e siècles*, vol. VII, Paris, 1990, pp. 30-36.

⁹ This inference is taken on the basis of the land-route that once existed under the name "Kadamba road" connecting Ela on the banks of river Mandovi with Gopakapattanam, located on the banks of river Zuari. However the port of Gopakapattanam did not disappear from the commercial map of Goa, as even in 1471, when general Khwaja Muhammed Gawan conquered Gopakapattanam, it was referred as "the major port of the land and as the cause of envy for all islands and ports of India". See Sherwani, *Khwaja-i-Jahan Gawan's Campaigns in the Maharashtra*, p. 274; João Manuel Pacheco de Figueiredo, "Goa Pre-Portuguesa" in *Studia* 13 and 14 (Janeiro-Julho 1964), pp. 134-135.

in 1369, they started concentrating much more on Ela and Diwar than on the Islamized port of Gopakapattanam.¹⁰ Meanwhile there appeared a process, which eventually led to the shifting of the economic centre of gravity of the region from the ports located on the banks of river Zuari to the ports located on the banks of river Mandovi. In this development Ela, supported by the satellite port of Raibandar¹¹ in the vicinity, emerged as the principal exchange center of the Southern Konkan. A wide variety of reasons including the silting of the port of Gopakapattanam, the proximity of Ela to timber-yielding Ponda forests, which would ensure regular supply of timber for shipbuilding activities, the closeness of the new port to the core centre of the Vijayanagara empire (which reduced the distance for the transportation of the horses through land route) and the relative distance from the Islamized city of Gopakapattanam, seem to have prompted the Vijayanagara rulers to opt for Ela as their principal port.¹²

Eventually the port of Ela passed into the hands of the Bahmani rulers¹³, from whom Yusuf Adil Shah took it up in 1498. It is highly probable that it was

¹⁰ Vasant Madhav, the minister of the Vijayanagara ruler Bukka I, defeated the forces of Bahmani Sultan and occupied Goa in 1369. See for details, J. Barros, *Ásia*, ed. Livraria Sam Carlos (facsimile of the edition of 1777-8), Lisboa, 1973, *Década* II, Livro V, Capítulo V, p. 135; B. A. Saletore, *Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire*, vol. I, Madras, 1934, p. 258. It was the Vijayanagara minister Vasanta Madhav (1379) who played key role in the reconstruction of the temple of Saptakoteshwar in Diwar. Henry Heras, "Pre-Portuguese Remains in Portuguese India" in *Journal of Bombay Historical Society*, IV (September 1932) 2, pp. 7-11; 40; J. M. P. Figueiredo, "Goa..." in *Studia* 13 and 14 (Janeiro-Julho 1964), pp. 154-155. The process of islamization of Gopakapattanam started with its conquest by Malik Kafur (1310), Muhammad-bin-Tughlaq (1327) and finally Jamal-ud-din of Honavar (1342-44). Cf. Muhammad Kasim Firishta, *Tarikh-i Firishta* translated by J. Briggs under the title *History of the Rise of the Mahmoden Power in India*, vol. I, Calcutta, 1909, p. 413. Ibn Batuta also refers to a city already erected by the Muslims in Gopakapattanam (apart from the city of the infidels) when they first captured the island. See Ibn Batuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354*, tran. by H. A. R. Gibb, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 239-240. For details on the attack of Gopakapattanam by the Muslim ruler of Honavar and acceptance of Islam by the ruler of Gopakapattanam see Ibn Batuta, *Travels...*, pp. 239-24; Burton Stein, *Vijayanagara*, Cambridge, 1994, p. 74.

¹¹ K. G. Vasanth Madhava, *Karnataka Third World*, Haleangadi, 2001, p. 21; V. T. Gune (ed.), *Gazetteer of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu*, Bombay, 1972, p. 131.

¹² The impact of Vijayanagara rule on Ela was so strong that even the value of commodities available in Ela on the eve of Portuguese conquest was recorded by them in the Vijayanagara currency called *Pardaos*, which was a corrupt form of Sanskrit *Pratap*. In fact *Pratap* or *Pagoda* was a gold coin and it was called *pagoda* because of the representation of *Varaha* or the Boar avatar of Vishnu on it. For details see Pius Malekandathil, "Merchants, Markets and Commodities: Some Aspects of Portuguese Commerce with Malabar" in Pius Malekandathil and Jamal Mohammed (eds.), *The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads: Festschrift in Honour of Prof. K. S. Mathew*, IRISH, Tellicherry/Fundação Oriente, Lisboa, 2001, p. 245.

¹³ During this period the number of Muslim settlers in this region increased considerably. A large number of Muslims, about 400 (*navayats*), from Onor (Honavar) and Baticala (Batal) were

during this long transitional phase by which Ela emerged as the leading port of the region that it came to be known as Juwa-Sindabur or Goa, which was an abbreviation for the old port of Govapuri alias Gopakapattanam. The appellation of Goa seems to have been affixed on it and subsequently used as to get commercial acceptability for this port among the merchants familiar with trading world of Gopakapattanam.¹⁴ Goa was the chief door through which the trading networks of Bijapur kingdom found wider maritime exposure. With the increase in the import of horses from Hormuz to Goa for distribution in the territories of Deccan rulers, it got considerable amount of wealth as custom duties, about 1,00,000 *pardaos* per year, which went into the exchequer of Yusuf Adil Shah.¹⁵

On the eve of the Portuguese arrival, the emerging cities of both Cochin and Goa, located at two different junctional points of the channels of commodity movements, were increasingly used by the local rulers as devices for furthering their political control and for bagging trade surplus. Consequently in the evolving urban lay-out, edifices symbolizing power exercise like the residence of Peumpadappu swarupam in Calvethy in Cochin¹⁶ and the residence of the representative of Bijapuri sultan in Goa¹⁷ occupied prime locations, around which a constellation of relations unfolded encompassing the networks of diverse merchant groups. In the pattern of spatial distribution each segment of the mercantile community demarcated, on the basis of either caste or religious or professional considerations, a particular portion of these cities for itself. In Mattancherry area of Cochin the settlement of the Muslim traders occupied a sizeable space, which extended up to Calvethy, while Amaravati was inhabited by Chetties and

came and settled in and around Ela in 1479 following their persecution by the Vijayanagara rulers for having supplied horses from Arabia and Persia to the Bahmani Sultan. João de Barros, *Ásia*, ed. Livraria Sam Carlos (facsimile of the edition of 1777-8), Lisboa, 1973, Década II, Livro V, Capítulo I, p. 434; G. Correia, *Lendas...*, tom. II, p. 55; J. M. P. Figueiredo, "Goa" in *Studia* 13 and 14 (Janeiro-Julho 1964), pp. 220-221.

¹⁴ This is inferred from the reference to Juwa-Sindabur of the Tuluva coast (which means southern part of Konkan) found in the famous navigational treatise of Ibn Majid of the fifteenth century. It must have been evidently a reference to Ela-Goa. See G. R. Tibbetts, *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Coming of the Portuguese* (original title of the book of Ibn Majid is *Kitab al Fawa'id fi usul al-bahr wa'l-qawa'id*), London, 1971, pp. 450, 454. However, there are also some others who argue that the place name of "Goa" was a later Lusitanian construction as to have a similarity in the names of power centers by making the name of the capital of Portuguese India (Goa) sound like the metropolitan capital (Lisboa).

¹⁵ J. Barros, *Ásia*, Década II, Livro V, Capítulo II, p. 24. Tomé Pires says that the duties collected on the objects of maritime trade in Goa and the neighbouring districts came about 400,000 *pardaos*. Cf. Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East Sea to Japan written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515*, edited and tran. by Armando Cortesão, vol. I, New Delhi, 1990, p. 58

¹⁶ During the time of the Portuguese arrival, the residence of the king of Cochin was in Calvethy, near the port. Cf. G. Correia, *Lendas...*, tom. I, Lisboa, 1858, p. 209.

¹⁷ The remnants of this structure are still visible in the vicinity of St. Cajetan's church of Goa.

Goldsmiths.¹⁸ The water-front was left relatively vacant and at times occupied by villages, probably of the fisher-folk,¹⁹ and the process of urban expansion of pre-Portuguese Cochin was from the port (Calvethy) to the hinterland.²⁰ In the pre-Portuguese city of Goa, as well, the same phenomena seem to have prevailed, as a result of which in the evolving spatial order, the outer layer of the urban settlement seems to have corresponded to the place now known as Ela.²¹

From Fluidity to Solidification of Power; Cities as the Venues for Transformation

The Portuguese got entry into the port city of Cochin through the channels of trade, opened with the initiatives of Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500. He obtained from the king of Cochin the site for a Portuguese factory in the vacant space of Cochin on the water-front, which they developed as the base for their initial economic operations and as a feeble nucleus for their emerging power in India.²² During first five years, the Portuguese state of Índia, which was in the process of making as an appendage of Lisbon administration, was relatively a fluvial and imperceptible power-exercising mechanism that made itself visible in the form of artilleries, guns and huge ships. In fact initially the Zamorin and his Muslim allies were fighting against this fluid political power, whose strength and weakness were beyond their perception and calculation. During the first five years, even this fluid political power of the Portuguese was visible only at the time of the arrival of the annual Portuguese fleet that entered Indian waters principally for trade. However its visibility assumed a definite and concrete form with the helping hand extended in times of emergency by the king of Cochin, between whom and the Portuguese there emerged reciprocal ties of protection and mutual support.²³ From Cochin, the roots of the expanding Lusitanian state

¹⁸ W. W. Hunter, *The Imperial...*, vol. IV, p. 13; F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1988, p. 71.

¹⁹ Fei Hsing, Hsing Cha's Sheng lan 30, "Kochih" in W.W. Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations..." in *T'oung Pao*, vol. XVI, Leiden, 1915, p. 452.

²⁰ Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime trade of India, 1500-1663* (A Volume in the south Asian study Series of Heidelberg University, Germany), New Delhi, 2001, pp. 337-8.

²¹ This is inferred on the basis of field study conducted in this region. It is interesting to note that the region still continues to be known as Ela.

²² F.C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India: Being a History of the Rise and Decline of their Empire*, vol. I, New Delhi, 1988, p. 72; William Brooks Greenlee (ed.), *The Voyage of Pedro Alvares Cabral to Brazil and India from Contemporary Documents and Narratives*, London, 1938, p. 143.

²³ The king of Cochin initially gave accommodation to the Portuguese in his own palace in times of crisis, besides granting site for their factory and settlement. He liberally gave them loan

were eventually penetrating into the soil of Quilon and Cannanore,²⁴ whose local rulers hoped that trade with the Portuguese would empower them for economic and political assertions.

The attempts to localize power and to give permanence to the power structure so far moving about in fluid form began with the establishment of a fortified headquarters at Cochin, under the control of a permanent residing viceroy in 1505 and supported by armed fortresses in Cannanore, Anjedive and Kilwa.²⁵ Later with the conquest of Goa in 1510 began the land-oriented expansion of the Portuguese power structure, whose limits were extended from Cochin to the doors of South East Asia with the conquest of Malacca (1511) and to the doors of Persian Gulf with the occupation of Hormuz (1515).²⁶ Frequent shipping and movement of forces of state between these territorial units and Cochin, reinforced by their subordinate and satellite power-exercising mechanisms, facilitated the otherwise scattered Portuguese pockets to get integrated with the power center, causing there to evolve a solidified and a perceptible territorial entity having significant marks of sovereignty with core area initially in Cochin and later in Goa. The nature of this state was almost similar to that of a political archipelago with connections hidden beneath the surface.²⁷ The channels of trade emanating

for the purchase of spices and used to stand as surety, when the Portuguese experienced shortage of capital. The Portuguese on their turn were always there to defend the king of Cochin in his battles against the Zamorin of Calicut. For details of these reciprocal ties and mutual support see K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin in the Pre-Industrial Era: A Study of Portuguese Cochin*, Pondicherry, 1990, pp. iii-x; K. M. Panikkar, *A History of Kerala*, p. 213; Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, pp. 37-40; 150-151.

²⁴ The Portuguese established first commercial contacts with Cannanore in 1501 and with Quilon in 1503. However the evident instruments of Portuguese state reached Cannanore with the erection of St. Angelo fortress (1508) and Quilon with their fortress St. Thomas completed in 1519. For details see G. Correia, *Lendas...*, tom. I, Lisboa, 1921, pp. 583; 728; tom. II, pp. 577; Antonio da Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões do Padroado Portugues do Oriente*, vol. I, Lisboa, 1948, p. 403.

²⁵ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History*, London, 1993, p. 72; Jaime Cortesão, *Os Descobrimientos Portugueses*, vol. VI, Lisboa, 1978, pp. 141-142.

²⁶ Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato, *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque seguidas de documentos que as elucidam*, tom. I, Lisboa, 1884, pp. 21ff; João de Barros, *Asia. Dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram no descobrimento e conquista dos Mares do Oriente*, Lisboa, 1771, *Década*, II, part II, pp. 40ff; 181; *Década* III, part II, pp. 451-452; Joaquim Verissimo Serrão, *Commentarios de Afonso de Albuquerque*, tom. I, Lisboa, 1973, p. 140; Duarte Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and their Inhabitants*, tran. by Mansel Longworth Dames, vol. I, Nendeln, 1967, p. 59.

²⁷ Conquest of Goa, Malacca and Hormus were effected with the fighting force mobilized from the vicinity of Cochin and dispatched from Cochin. For details see Pius Malekandathil, "Maritime Malabar and a Mercantile State: Polity and State Formation in Malabar under the Portuguese: 1498-1663", in K. S. Mathew (ed.), *Maritime Malabar and the Europeans*, London, 2003, p. 203.

either from Cochin or Goa and touching the diverse Portuguese enclaves in the Indian Ocean coupled with the regular circulatory process of commodity movements among them held these widely dispersed territorial pockets together and provided a great amount of cohesiveness and unity to the slowly evolving state structure of the *Estado da Índia*.

In the process of localizing power and giving permanence to the Lusitanian power exercising devices in India, preference was given to the cities of Cochin and Goa and it was into their urban space that Portuguese power was first inscribed. Initially these two cities provided the spatial platform for the process of solidification of power from a fluvial to a localized permanent stature, converting the cities to be the fundamental political units of the *Estado*. Their urban lay out was initially done giving priority and visibility to the power exercising institutions. In Cochin the fortress occupied the core position in the early period, followed by the factory, the weighing place of pepper, the Franciscan monastery and the hospital in the subordinate ranks.²⁸ However in the city of Goa the old palace of the "Sabaio" converted into the Governor's palace became the central institution, particularly after the shifting of the seat of the *Estado* to Goa. The municipal building, the Franciscan monastery, the chapel erected in honour of St. Catherine and an adjacent hospital, were the other early urban structures in Portuguese Goa.²⁹ While the Portuguese city of Cochin known as Cochin *de baixo* evolved around the fort of Manuel (initially erected in 1503)³⁰ keeping itself distinct and separate from the already existing native Cochin or Cochin *de cima* (Mattancherry),³¹ the Portuguese city of Goa emerged by erasing the existing city and grafting Lusitanian urban structures onto it. This happened principally with the shifting of the political headquarters of the *Estado* from Cochin to Goa in 1530,³² following which attempts were made to restructure the city of Goa as to suit its position as being the power center. Correspondingly several new and magnificent urban structures evoking awe and impression

²⁸ G. Correia, *Lendas...*, tom. I, cap. IV, pp. 393-5; cap. XV, pp. 625-33; cap. XVI, pp. 633-7. Almeida strengthened the fortress with granite stones. IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 14, Maço 3, doc. 14. The factory, the weighing place of pepper and the Franciscan monastery are seen in the early plans of the city of Cochin. For their locations see Luis da Silveira (ed.), *Ensaio de Iconografia das Cidades*, vol. III, Lisboa, pp. 413-6.

²⁹ For details on the Franciscan monastery of Goa whose building process started in 1518 see IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronologico* I, Maço 23, doc. 133 and doc. 142. The buildings of the Franciscan monasteries of Goa and Cochin got completed in 1520. IAN/TT, *Fragmentos* 1, letter of Frei Antonio to the king dated 27-10-1520; *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*, 13, p. 721.

³⁰ Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, *Historia do descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portugueses*, tom. I, liv. II, cap. XXVIII, Coimbra, 1924, pp. 273-4; G. Correia, *Lendas...*, tom. I, cap. IV, pp. 393-5; Lisboa, 1921, p. 2.

³¹ For details see Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, pp. 74-76.

³² Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *Os Descobrimientos e a Economia Mundial*, vol. III, Lisboa, 1982, p. 34.

were increasingly set up in Goa from 1540 onwards.³³ This phenomenon started with increasing generation of wealth from the agrarian territories of Bardez and Salcete added to Goa in 1543³⁴ and from the intensified intra-Asian trade carried out by the Portuguese *casados* of Goa.

By mid-1540s a considerable portion of trade surplus of the *casados* was transferred for beautifying their habitation and also for building magnificent churches or civic structures of Goa and Cochin, evidently with the logic of making the power and prestige of the Portuguese state visible and impressive. Consequently in the city of Goa and surroundings several strong church structures started appearing, which are numbered to be 14.³⁵ Meanwhile, the parish church of Cochin, which had palm thatching till 1541, was modified and restructured to match with the change.³⁶ The nucleus of Madre Deus College started eventually soaring to the heights of three storeys, though its final completion took place much later.³⁷ In all these structures we find the attempts of the city-dwellers to articulate visually the wealth of the state and consequently make its weight of power architecturally visible to the local rulers and their collaborators in an awe-evoking manner.

³³ The slow and gradual process of stamping of Lusitanian urban space onto Goa following the shifting of power center to this city is traceable from the sketch of the city provided by João Castro in 1540s and other sketches provided by Luis da Silveira. Cf. Mathias Mundadan, *History of Christianity in India*, vol. I, Bangalore, 1989; Luis da Silveira. (ed.), *Ensaio de Iconografia das Cidades do Ultramar*, vol. III, Lisboa, pp. 360-83. The beginning of strong and durable urban structures in these Portuguese cities could be traced back to 1518 when the foundations of the Franciscan monasteries were laid both in Cochin and Goa. See for details IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 23, doc. 133 and doc. 142.

³⁴ In 1543 the Governor Martim Afonso obtained from the Adil Shah the perpetual donation of Salcete and Bardez to the Crown. From 1541 onwards began the process of temple-destruction in the island of Goa redirecting its agrarian wealth towards the construction of *capelas* in the islands. See Joaquim Heliodoro da Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*, fascículo 5, Lisboa, 1954, p. 75. Martim Afonso de Mello wrote to the Portuguese king in 1541 that the temples were destroyed in the island and many *capelas* were constructed in their stead, despite the opposition from Crishna (Krishnan, Luqu and Anu Sinai (Anu Shenoy)), IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 70, doc. 123.

³⁵ Georg Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier, His Life, His Times, vol. II: India, 1541-1545*, translated by M. Joseph Costelloe, Rome, 1977, pp. 187-91; 213; António de Silva Rego (ed.), *Documentação...*, vol. I, pp. 213-17; vol. II, p. 36; G. Correia, *Lendas...*, II, p. 199, IV, p. 140.

³⁶ In the letter of Fr. Sebastian Pirez Vicar General sent to the king of Portugal on 1st January 1522 it is mentioned that the main church of Cochin was thatched with palm leaves. See IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 27, doc. 93. Though there were 1000 Christians in Cochin by 1527 the main church continued to remain in an unfinished form. IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 38, doc. 51. Even in 1541 this church remained as a structure thatched with palm leaves. See IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 69, doc. 2.

³⁷ Josef Wicki (ed.), *Documenta Indica*, vol. I, doc. 81, Rome, 1948, p. 521. In fact the Madre de Deus church of Cochin was given to the Jesuits on 29th December 1550, where the Jesuits built

Peopling of the Cities and the Making of Citizens for the *Estado*

Though the nucleus of a Portuguese state structure had appeared in Cochin as early as 1505, in the initial phase the emerging state comprised mostly of officials of trade or soldiers engaged in the service of the crown. It in fact appeared to be a state devoid of actual citizens. Afonso de Albuquerque, who realized the intensity of the problem emerging from the deficiency in civil population supportive of the state, tried to solve it by giving permission to many soldiers, the vital apparatus of a state, to forego their profession and get married to Indian women. This was for the purpose of achieving a longer goal of realizing sufficient demographic strength and thus ensuring a generation supportive of Portuguese dominance.³⁸ Thus in 1512 there were 100 Portuguese *casados* in Cochin and 200 Portuguese *casados* in Goa.³⁹ These Portuguese married people became the nucleus of the civil population of the *Estado*, which transformation was realized over a long span of time within the frames of the urban spaces of Cochin and Goa. For the sustenance of the married Portuguese citizens Albuquerque allotted petty trade, and permitted them to set up shops and manufacturing units including shoe making, baking and tailoring.⁴⁰ In course of time, a collectivity of citizens or civil society, sustained by trade and keen on developing the private initiatives of urban-dwellers, got shaped and incorporated into the Portuguese habitats of Cochin and Goa.

However, with the emergence of a relatively considerable number of private entrepreneurs in Cochin there began a phase of inevitable clash between their private interests and those of the crown. In the final outcome the state was necessitated to reshape its structure giving space for the private traders of Cochin.⁴¹ Consequently, from 1515 onwards, several administrators and officials

the Madre de Deus College. IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 85, doc. 121. For further details on Madre de Deus College of the Jesuits in Cochin see the letter of P.^e Antonio Gomes SJ written to St. Ignatius Loyola in 1551, Archive der Gesellschaft Jesu, Goa, 10, docs. 107 and 185. Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, *Collecção de Pombal*, 745, doc. 19; the letter of Nicolo Lancilotto SJ dated 24-4-1552.

³⁸ Cf. K. M. Panikkar, *Malabar and the Portuguese, 1500-1663*, Bombay, 1929, p. 84.

³⁹ IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 11, doc. 50. Letter of Afonso de Albuquerque dated 1-4-1512.

⁴⁰ Cf. K. M. Panikkar, *Malabar and the Portuguese...*, p. 84; António da Silva Rego, *Documentação...*, vol. I, doc. 44, p. 118.

⁴¹ In this clash, a lobbying group among the *casados* known as Cochin group clamoured for an atmosphere of free trade with less state interference. Cf. Pius Malekandathil, "The Portuguese *Casados* and the Intra-Asian Trade: 1500-1663" in *The Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Millennium (61st) Session, Kolkata, 2001, pp. 385-8; For details see also Vítor Luís Gaspar Rodrigues, "O Grupo de Cochim e a Oposição a Afonso de Albuquerque" in *Stydia* 51 (1992), pp. 119-144; Luís Filipe Thomaz, "Diogo Pereira, O Malabar", *Mare Liberum* 5 (1993),

(including governor Lopo Soares de Albergia), who were unenthusiastic about rigorous state intervention in trade and were supportive of the Portuguese private entrepreneurs, were made in charge of the decisive and strategic posts of the *Estado da Índia*, evidently for the purpose of reorganizing its structure and form incorporating the needs and aspirations of the commercially-oriented citizens of Cochin.⁴²

Against the background of favourable and liberal atmosphere of trade thus created in Cochin, many Portuguese *casado* traders preferred to have their habitat in this city and the number of the Portuguese houses that were eventually set up rose to 300 in 1517.⁴³ Several Portuguese *casado* traders among them like Diogo Pereira,⁴⁴ played decisive role in making the commodity streams from Chaul and Cambay on the one hand and from Bengal, Pegu as well as Malacca on the other hand, merge at Cochin. Meanwhile some of them who made commercial expansion into South East Asia, either on their individual initiative or making use of the commercial networks of the Muslim relatives of their wives, were later made to supply the sophisticated spices like cloves, nutmeg and mace in Cochin for the Lisbon-bound vessels, which process augmented particularly with the termination of royal monopoly over the spice trade in Malacca and Moluccas in 1533 and 1537 respectively.⁴⁵ Still some others joined hands with the callous Portuguese officials and the Marakkar merchants to send commodities to the ports of Red Sea controlled by the Ottomans.⁴⁶

pp. 49-64; Geneviève Bouchon and Luís Filipe Thomaz (ed.), *Voyage dans Les Deltas du Gange et de l'Irraouaddy 1521*, Paris, 1988, pp. 58-68.

⁴² The most important change thus effected was the eventual demarcation of the space east of Cape Comorin, which was relatively free of state interference, for the *casado* entrepreneurs for the purpose of conducting trade. Cf. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History*, London, 1993, p. 97.

⁴³ Miloslav Krasa, Joseph Polisensky and Peter Ratos (ed.), *European Expansion 1494-1519: The Voyages of Discovery in the Bratislava Manuscript*, Lyc.515/8, Prague, 1986, p. 106.

⁴⁴ R. A. de Bulhão Pato, *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque...*, tom. I, p. 197; Luís Filipe Thomaz, "Diogo Pereira, O Malabar" in *Mare Liberum* 5 (1993), pp. 50-64.

⁴⁵ See the treatise on the drugs and spices of Malacca dated 23rd September 1533, IAN/TT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis*, doc. 21; Luís Filipe Thomaz, *Os Portugueses em Malacca (1511-1580)*, vol. II, *Mestrado* thesis submitted at the Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, 1964, doc. 98, p. 278; Luís Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago during the 16th Century", *Archipel* 18 (1979), SPAFA Consultation Workshop on Research in Maritime Shipping and Trade Networks in South East Asia, Cisarua, West Java, Nov. 20-27, 1984, p. 76.

⁴⁶ In 1521, we find the very governor Diogo Lopes Sequeira and another Portuguese private trader joining hands with Kuti Ali, a Marakkar merchant, to send pepper to Red Sea. Cf. R. S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India: 1498-1550*, New Delhi, 1989, p. 196; Pius Malekandathil, "From Merchant Capitalists to Corsairs"..., pp. 75-96. It was in 1516 that the Mamluk Sultan Kansuh al-Gauri was completely defeated and killed by Selim near Aleppo. By the end of January 1517 Cairo was in Selim's hands and thereby he became the guardian and master

In fact the very desire to base Portuguese operations in Goa emerged from the fact that it remained outside the range of Zamorin's recurring attacks and that it is of equi-distance from Kerala and Gujarat, a position which enabled them to intervene in the trade of both the regions by controlling Goa and to block the flow of commodities to the ports of Red sea by regular patrolling.⁴⁷ However soon private trade of the *casados* of Goa began to draw strength and by 1520s the flourishing trade of Goa started passing hands from Krishna, Raluchatim and Loquchatim⁴⁸ into those of the Portuguese *casados*.⁴⁹ The Goan *casados* began to bag huge profits by actively involving in the Goa-Bengal-Malacca-Coromandel-Malacca-Goa and Goa-Malacca-South East Asian routes, particularly after the termination of crown trade in Malacca and Moluccas.⁵⁰ The crown seems to have encouraged these traders not only because commerce provided a livelihood to them; but also because they were slowly emerging as a substitute to the prominent and the traditional merchant groups like the Muslims and the *baniyas*, who had dominated the Indian Ocean trading scenario. So the creation of a mercantile class from the Portuguese citizens of Cochin and Goa was a need of the times. This was realized by increasingly resorting to the trade-devices of *quintaladas*, voyages, licences and other trade concessions, by which the state was required only less to pay while the individuals had to earn the rest by his personal initiatives.⁵¹ In this process, slowly Cochin and Goa turned out to be junctional points where diverse trade networks got intersected and spatial units where multiple types of social relations evolved following the acceleration of the process of distribution and re-distribution of wealth.

of the holy places of Medina and Mecca and also the controller of trade in the Red Sea. For details see M. S. Anderson, *The Origin of the Modern European State system, 1494-1618*, London, 1998, p. 234; Jean Louis Bacque-Grammont et Anne Kroell (ed.), *Mamlouks, Ottomans et Portugais en mer Rouge. L'affaire de Djedda en 1517*, Supplement aux *Annales Islamologiques*, Le Caire, 1988. See also Pius Malekandathil, "The Ottoman Expansion and the Portuguese Response in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1560" in M. N. Pearson and Charles Borges (ed.), *Metahistory, History Questioning History: Festschrift in Honour of Teotonio R de Souza*, Lisboa, 2007, pp. 497-508.

⁴⁷ José Ramos Coelho (ed.), *Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo*, Lisboa, 1892, pp. 237-9; Fortunato de Almeida, *História de Portugal (1385-1580)*, tom. III, Coimbra, 1925, pp. 570-578.

⁴⁸ IAN/TT, *Fragmentos* 26, fol. 25-48; 27, fols. 47-65; IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 20-2-24.

⁴⁹ IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 20-10-26.

⁵⁰ See the treatise on the drugs and spices of Malacca dated 23rd September 1533, IAN/TT, *Cartas dos Vice-Reis*, doc. 21; Luís Filipe Thomaz, *Os Portugueses em Malacca...*, vol. II, doc. 98, p. 278; Luís Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago...", SPAFA Consultation Workshop on Research in Maritime Shipping and Trade Networks in South East Asia, Cisarua, West Java, Nov. 20-27, 1984, pp. 70-80; Adelino de Almeida Calado, *Livro que trata das cousas da Índia e do Japão*, pp. 52-53.

⁵¹ Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, pp. 171-2.

The *Estado da Índia* tried to incorporate these trade networks and webs of social relations within the frames of its politico-economic structure through a process of strategic planning, which commenced with the conferring of urban status on Goa in 1518⁵² and on Cochin in 1527.⁵³ At the time of elevation of Cochin to the status of a city in 1527 there were 160 Portuguese married men in the city. However Goa had larger number of urban dwellers, whose number in 1527 was 500 *casados*.⁵⁴ Religion wise there were 1000 Christians in Cochin,⁵⁵ out of whom many seem to be non-Portuguese. Meanwhile, the size of urban population of Goa went on increasing. In 1529 the number of Portuguese *casados* in Goa rose to 800, having about 1000 Portuguese children in the city.⁵⁶ With the increase in the size of urban dwellers in these cities, the Municipal councils also started becoming significantly active. The Municipal councils of both Goa and Cochin and the numerous legislations produced by them were utilized as devices for standardizing and thus controlling the socio-economic behaviour of these urban dwellers and for consolidating their diverse social spaces into the political frame of the *Estado*. Providing access to a vast world of their human and material resources and facilitating the attempts of the Lusitanians to further their political control over the process of creation and expropriation of surplus, the urban units of Goa and Cochin turned out to be the most strategic and fundamental political units of the *Estado*.⁵⁷

The administration of the city affairs passed into the hands of the urban elite, through the mechanism of city council elected from the Portuguese married settlers.⁵⁸ In fact the control of the municipal offices of Cochin and Goa by merchant elites resulted in the implementation of the aspirations of trading groups at the grass root level of administration in these cities. The hold over Municipal offices, supported by the legislative powers of the city council, also enabled them to ensure legitimacy, continuity and stability to the private trading

⁵² IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* II, Maço 234, doc. 7; J. H. da Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Arquivo...*, fascículo 2, pp. 1ff.

⁵³ K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc.1, pp. 1-3.

⁵⁴ IAN/TT, *Gavetas* 15, Maço 17, doc. 19, letter of Luís Martins de Portalegre to the crown dated 1-12-1527.

⁵⁵ IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 38, doc. 51.

⁵⁶ IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 20-2-23. Letter of Diogo Mariz to the king dated 13-11-1529.

⁵⁷ This empirical analysis is done on the basis of the argument of H. Kamen, who says that town communities were the fundamental political units of civilized Europe and that they had a special identity based on political and civic privileges. Cf. H. Kamen, *Early Modern European Society*, London, 2000, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁸ *Regimento dos Officiais das Cidades, Villas e lugares destes Reynos com Privilegio del Rey nosso Senhor*, Lisboa, 1504; C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Society in the Tropics: The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia and Luanda, 1510-1580*, Madison, 1965, pp. 5-8; M. N. Pearson, *Coastal Western India: Studies from the Portuguese Records*, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 52-3.

networks that they had developed over decades. This is evidently seen in the eventual replacement of the patrolling fleet, which was earlier introduced on the Malabar coast with a view to preventing diversion of spices to the Red Sea-Mediterranean route, by a municipal navy of Cochin to suit the needs of the private traders of the city. Eventually the Municipality of Cochin bagged the right to appoint the captain-in-chief of the patrolling fleet,⁵⁹ evidently to protect the private interests of its city-dwellers. The city of Cochin is estimated to have spent about 25, 078 *pardaos* during the period between 1587 and 1598 for the purpose of patrolling the coast alone. However the very purpose of the patrolling of the coast, changed as these *armadas* were concerned more and more with the protection of the private vessels of the *casados* coming from the eastern space of Indian Ocean rather than those of the crown involved in Indo-European trade.⁶⁰ This transformation of the southern armada from a mechanism to safeguard the royal trade into one to protect the private trade of the *casados* is clearly indicative of the influence exerted by the urban elite through the Municipal council of Cochin even to the extent of using the stately infrastructure for the purpose of protecting their private interests.⁶¹

The state tried to prevent the private ventures of the *casados* from going to the extreme and to avoid the excesses, by frequent interventions through the mechanism of crown-granted charters. Though the royal charters to the municipalities externally appeared to be a set of commercial privileges conferred upon the citizens, in practice they turned out to be devices for applying constraints and brakes on them and to get their aspirations pruned for the benefit of the state.⁶² The evident case is that of the tax concession given to the merchants trading on the sides of *Rua Direita* in Goa, who were exempted from paying ¼ duty.⁶³ Tax concession was given also to the *casados* of Cochin. Though the reduction of customs duties of Cochin from 6% to 3.5% for the wares of the *casados* was done as a commercial concession to them (of course on the repeated requests and interventions of the king of Cochin and the *casados*),⁶⁴ it was so done not

⁵⁹ K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad, *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 51, p. 70.

⁶⁰ The city of Cochin raised an amount of 25,078 *pardaos* from the *casados* as one per cent tax during the period between 1587 and 1598 and this amount was utilized only for the purpose of patrolling the coast up to Cape Comorin. See BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Cod. 1980, "Livro das Despezas de hum por cento", fols. 3-11, 19-26. Because of the constant threat from the corsairs, the *casado* vessels were collected from Cape Comorin by this navy and were taken in caravan to Cochin.

⁶¹ Pius Malekandathil, "The Mercantile Networks and the International Trade of Cochin" in Ernst van Veen and Leonard Blussé (ed.), *Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks*, Leiden University, Leiden, 2005, pp. 152-3.

⁶² For example see the nature of the privileges given to the city of Goa in IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* II, Maço 234, doc. 7; J. H. da Cunha (ed.), *Arquivo...*, fascículo 2, pp. 1ff.

⁶³ J. H. da Cunha (ed.), *Arquivo...*, fascículo 2, p. 23.

⁶⁴ K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 53, pp. 73-84; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline, 1600-1650: Myth and Manipulation in the *Estado da Índia*"

only to please the *casado* traders and the local ruler, who derived the immediate benefit out of it, but also as a device to keep the private traders attracted to and get linked with the Portuguese settlement of Cochin and thus consolidate the mobile Portuguese traders with the state structure. Had the tax being higher they would have gone to other trading centers located outside the Portuguese trading system, where they had to pay only less customs.⁶⁵ In fact trade concessions and commercial privileges were used as integrating and cohesive devices for keeping the mobile Portuguese private traders integrated with the state that used to periodically confer trade privileges upon them under different pretexts.

Meanwhile the municipalities of these two cities were also allowed to develop a strong legal tradition as a defense device against the interference of crown or its officials in their affairs.⁶⁶ The grant of legal autonomy in the cities, on the one hand, enabled the city council to accommodate local needs and private aspirations of the urban population in the process of legislation and administration,⁶⁷ while on the other hand, served to minimize the amount of hostility that prevailed among some segments of the *casado* traders towards the state as commercial competitor.⁶⁸ Above all, the urban legal traditions of Goa

in Roderich Ptak (ed.), *Portuguese Asia: Aspects in History and Economic History*, Stuttgart, 1987, pp. 67-8.

⁶⁵ The Portuguese traders were always on the move looking for profitable commercial avenues and ports having less customs duty. In this process some went to inland trade centers as well. Thus in 1528 there were about 350 to 400 Portuguese in the trade centers of Vijaynagara alone. IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 38, doc. 1. Later when the Cochinites moved to other maritime trade centers like Nagapattanam, they demanded that they should be given the same tax-concession as they used to enjoy in Cochin. Cf. AHU, *Índia*, Caixa 16, doc. 34, dated 12-2-1644.

⁶⁶ For details on the nature of the legal traditions that existed in Cochin and Goa see K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 9, p. 22; doc. 30, pp. 44-5; doc. 53, pp. 71-2; J.H. da Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Arquivo...*, fascículo 2, pp. 1 ff.

⁶⁷ For details on legislations accommodating local needs see the laws made to avail food-materials in the city see K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 55, p. 86; doc. 59, pp. 90-1; doc. 61, p. 93; doc. 63, pp. 95-6. Examples of legislations made to accommodate aspirations of the urban population could be seen in the laws passed to dispose land in the city, as per the needs of the urban elite. *Ibidem*, doc. 18, p. 31.

⁶⁸ The hostility of some of the Portuguese *casados* of Cochin towards the interventionist state is visible in the case of the *casados* living almost five or six leagues away from Cochin in places like Culimute (?) and making armaments for Kunjali's men and trading with them on contraband commodities. They built ships for the Muslim corsairs and helped the latter to enlarge their fleet and with the help of the Muslim merchants they even attacked the fleet of the *Estado*, an act which had come out of common economic interests touching their private trade in Asia. IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* II, Maço 211, doc. 65, fols. 5-6. The Letter of Diogo Fernandes to D. John III dated 1-6-1537; See also Jorge Manuel Costa da Silva Flores, *Os Portugueses e o Mar de Ceilão 1498-1543: Trato, Diplomacia e Guerra*, Dissertação de Mestrado em História dos Descobrimentos e da Expansão Portuguesa presented to the Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1991, pp. 200-205. Competition for wealth, resources and for sharing of

and Cochin were used to standardize and homogenize the urban behaviour,⁶⁹ which in turn was also increasingly banked upon as a mechanism to integrate the urban populace with the state.⁷⁰

The cities of Goa and Cochin absorbed the large flow of people from the mother country to India following the recurring famines and frequent outbreak of pestilences in Portugal. By providing European urban milieu and ample opportunities for a decent living by participation in trade, the urban spaces of Goa and Cochin acted as shock-absorbing devices for the Lusitanians who fled from the cities of Portugal during the famines of 1521, 1522 and outbreak of the great pestilences of 1524 as well as 1530-1.⁷¹ Subsequent to this and particularly from 1530 onwards, we find a radical change in the demographic structure and composition of the Portuguese cities of Goa and Cochin.⁷² The number of Lusitanians in Goa increased to 1000 in 1529, out of which 800 were *casados*.⁷³

power between the Crown and entrepreneurial segment of the urban (merchant) élites was evidently visible in most of the Portuguese cities, particularly Cochin and Goa.

⁶⁹ The behavioural standardization was done in Cochin by restricting the voting right in the city council to the virtuous Portuguese settlers of Cochin. K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 80, pp. 119-20. Another example for standardization was the city administrative arrangement to manage the problems of cleanliness and tidiness of the city. *Ibidem*, doc. 10, p. 23.

⁷⁰ Most important appointments made in the city council like those of the inspector for the cleanliness of the city, supervisor for shipbuilding, officer in charge of the mint etc., were to be approved by the crown or its officials suggesting that this procedural format inherently implied restriction and subjugation of the urban autonomy to the authority of state. The different regulations pertaining to them acted as devices of integration. For example see *Ibidem*, doc. 10, pp. 23-4; doc. 25, p. 39; doc. 33, p. 47; doc. 44, pp. 61-2; doc. 52, pp. 71-2.

⁷¹ During the times of famines and pestilences many Portuguese citizens turned to Indian colonies as better centres for safe living. The outbreak of the great pestilence of 1530-31 in Lisbon made many flee the capital and the royal city was completely deserted. For details on the famine and pestilence, see Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *História de Portugal*, vol. III, Lisboa, 1978, p.31. The German eye-witness says that the Portuguese king and the royal family fled to Palmada, while the inhabitants left the city. See for details Albert Haemmerle (ed.), *Stetten-Jahrbuch*. MCML, vol. II, Deren von Steten Geschlechterbuch MDXXXVIII, pp. 52ff; Hermann Kellenbenz, "Os Mercadores Alemães de Lisboa por volta de 1530", *Separata da Revista Portuguesa de História*, vol. IX, Coimbra, 1961, pp. 12-13; Pius Malekandathil, "The Portuguese *Casados*...", pp. 388-9; For the migration of Portuguese citizens to India, see António Sérgio, *Obras Completas de António Sérgio. Introdução Geográfico-Sociológica à História de Portugal*, Critical Edition guided by Castelo Branco Chaves, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Rui Gracio and Joel Serrão, Lisboa, 1976, p. 191.

⁷² In Cochin there began a great inflow of new Christians particularly from 1533 onwards. For details, see José Alberto Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, "Outras gentes em outras Rotas: Judeus e Cristãos-novos de Cochim – entre Santa Cruz de Cochim e Mattancherry, entre o Império Português do Médio Oriente", A paper presented in *VIII Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa*, Angra de Heroísmo, 7-11 de Junho de 1996, pp. 4-9.

⁷³ IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 20-2-23. See the letter of Diogo Mariz written to the crown dated 13-11-1529.

By 1542, there were altogether 15,000 Christians in Cochin (area) of whom more than 300 were *casados*, married and settled down in the city of Santa Cruz of Cochin⁷⁴. In 1546, the number of Portuguese men residing in Cochin was estimated to be 570 out of which 343 were married settlers.⁷⁵ By mid-1540s the demographic strength of Goa rose to 1600 Portuguese citizens and 3000 soldiers.⁷⁶ The number of the married Portuguese settlers of Cochin rose to 500 by 1551.⁷⁷ The new migrants from Portugal, who settled down in the cities of Cochin and Goa began to interact with the urban geography expanding the territorial limits and the spatial dimensions of these cities. With the increase in the city-population and particularly from 1540 onwards, the king of Portugal started showing great concern and interest in the construction of city wall in Goa encircling the Portuguese settlers⁷⁸ and three new parish churches were erected in the city in 1545.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, by allowing the new comers to settle down in the Portuguese urban space, the Portuguese state managed to overcome, to a certain extent, the problem of chronic paucity of manpower, and convert them into its citizens. The Portuguese authorities had to accommodate themselves to this situation and adopt a policy in which sufficient space was carved out for the commercial enterprise of the new comers. Chances for decent livelihood and opportunities for private initiatives were offered to them through the system of licences, voyages and other trade concessions, using which privileges they began to co-operate with the first generation of *casados*, who had already established a vast commercial network in the Indian Ocean.⁸⁰ As a result the volume of trade began to increase and the customs duty on spices in Goa rose to 1350 *pardaos* and that of the food grains amounted to 2500 *pardaos* in the 1540s.⁸¹

⁷⁴ Mathias Mundadan, *History of Christianity*, vol. I, Bangalore, 1984, p. 359.

⁷⁵ The letter of Henrique de Sousa written to the governor dated 15-5-1546, in Elaine Sanceau (ed.), *Colecção de São Lourenço*, vol. II, p. 321.

⁷⁶ Georg Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier, His Life, His Times*, vol. II: *India, 1541-1545*, translated by M. Joseph Costelloe, Rome, 1977, pp. 187-91; 213; António da Silva Rego (ed.), *Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente, Índia*, vol. I, Lisboa, 1948, pp.213-17; vol. II, p.36; Gaspar Correia, *Lendas...*, II, p. 199, IV, p. 140.

⁷⁷ The letter of the viceroy written to the king dated 16-1-1551, IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* II, Maço 242, doc. 44.

⁷⁸ Letter of the king of Portugal to the city of Goa. *Livro das cartas que os reis de Portugal escreveram à cidade de Goa*, in J. H. da Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Arquivo...*, fascículo 1, p. 8.

⁷⁹ See the letter of Estêvão Madeira to Pedro d'Alcáçova dated 25-1- 1545, IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 76, doc. 11. The other early important churches were those of Nossa Senhora de Serra, Nossa Senhora da Luz and Nossa Senhora do Rosário. See IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 20-2-23 letter of Diogo Mariz to the king of Portugal dated 13-11-1529. IAN/TT, *Corpo Cronológico* I, Maço 25, doc. 55; Maço 65, doc. 72.

⁸⁰ Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, pp. 170-8.

⁸¹ Francisco Xavier Ernesto Fernandes, *Regimen do Sal, Abkary e Alfandegas da Índia*, Lisboa, 1905, pp. 23-27.

Cities and the Imperial Defense Strategy

The Portuguese state considered the cities of Goa and Cochin as the source of the authority needed to retain its possessions and started increasingly banking upon them, both their human and material resources, for defending the empire against the background of expansion of the Ottoman State into the rim of Indian Ocean. With the occupation of Cairo (1516) and Suez (1517) by the Ottomans, commodity movements from Calicut to the ports of Ottoman Turks had already become relatively frequent, particularly during the period between 1526 and 1527.⁸² Later the establishment of a naval base in Basra by the Ottomans in 1534⁸³ was followed by their entry into Indian waters to capture Diu.⁸⁴ In 1538 another Ottoman fleet visited Vizhinjam,⁸⁵ a southern port of Kerala, which corresponds roughly to the time when Kunjali and his Marakkar allies were chased and defeated by the Portuguese at Vedalai and Negombo.⁸⁶ This is suggestive of the wider nexus that had evolved by this time between the Marakkars of Kerala and the Ottomans.⁸⁷ Against this background of the ubiquitous presence of the Ottomans in the visible vicinity of Portuguese possessions, the crown and its officials started increasingly using the cities of Cochin and Goa for mobilizing resources for the purpose of defending the *Estado* from Ottoman attacks.⁸⁸ Attempts were made to mobilize large amount of material and human resources from these cities, when the Ottomans laid siege on Diu in 1546 and D. João de Castro took about 1500 men from these urban centres to Diu on 20th September

⁸² G. Correia, *Lendas...*, Tomo III, parte I, pp. 274-5.

⁸³ Salih Özbaran, "The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534-1581", in *Journal of Asian History*, VI, 1 (1972), pp. 52-54. In 1538 the name of the Ottoman Sultan was stamped on the coinage and included in the *khutba* at Basra. In 1546 Basra was formally integrated into the empire.

⁸⁴ Dejanirah Couto, "Les Ottomans et l'Inde portugaise", *Vasco da Gama et l'Inde*, vol. 1, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Paris, 1999, pp. 185-88; Salih Özbaran, *The Ottoman Response to European Expansion - Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century*, Analecta Isisiana XIII, Istanbul, 1994, pp. 99-109.

⁸⁵ G. Correia, *Lendas...*, tom. III, p. 882.

⁸⁶ J. Barros, *Ásia. Dos feitos que os Portugueses fizeram no Descobrimto e Conquista dos Mares e Terras do Oriente*, Lisboa, 1973, Decada IV, liv.8, pp. 12-14; Diogo Couto, *Da Ásia dos feitos que os Portugueses fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimto das Terras e Mares do Oriente*, Decada V, liv. 2, Lisboa, 1973, pp. 4-6, 8.

⁸⁷ Pius Malekandathil, "Winds of Change and Links of Continuity: A Study on the Merchant Groups of Kerala and the Channels of their Trade, 1000-1800" in *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 50, 2 (2007), pp. 271-3.

⁸⁸ Pius Malekandathil, "The Ottoman Expansion...", pp. 502-4.

1546.⁸⁹ While a good many of them like Antonio Leme,⁹⁰ Manoel de Sousa de Sepulveda,⁹¹ Francisco da Silva,⁹² Sebastião Luis, *alcaide-mor* of Cochin,⁹³ Antonio Correa, the very factor of Cochin,⁹⁴ etc., were mobilized from Cochin, a considerably great number was gathered from Goa, as well, like Lucas Veiga,⁹⁵ Dom Leitão,⁹⁶ Simão da Rocha,⁹⁷ Sebastião Lopez Lobato,⁹⁸ Francisco Navaes Pereira,⁹⁹ Vasco Rebello,¹⁰⁰ Pedro de Liao,¹⁰¹ etc. The lifting of the siege on Diu was effected thanks to the help, both in the form of wealth and men, extended by the cities of Cochin and Goa. The crown, later wrote special letters to both the cities acknowledging the prompt help received from their urban dwellers.¹⁰² Meanwhile his representative in India, governor D. João de Castro, rewarded those city-dwellers of Goa and Cochin who had fought for the defence of Diu in 1546 by granting commercial voyages, in most cases, to Bengal or Malacca or Ormuz.¹⁰³

By this mechanism of rewarding with commercial voyages, the cities were more and more integrated into the defense-strategy of the *Estado* as its essen-

⁸⁹ António Baião, *História Quinhentista (inédita) do Segundo cerco de Dio*, Coimbra, 1927, p. 298.

⁹⁰ António Leme was given the permission to get a ship built in Malabar and to send commodities to any of the ports in Bengal as reward for fighting for the state at Diu. A. Baião, *História Quinhentista...*, p. 298.

⁹¹ On 21st February 1547, Manoel de Sousa de Sepúlveda was permitted to send a ship to Bengal, for having served in Diu and for having spent a lot of money feeding the fighting forces. *Ibidem*, p. 312

⁹² The *casado* trader of Cochin, Francisco da Silva was given a grant of voyage on 23rd November 1547 as reward for his role in the defence of Diu, by which he could send every year one ship each to Bengal, Arakan and Moluccas. Biblioteca do Palácio da Ajuda, *Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro*, 51-8-46, fol. 193v.

⁹³ IAN/TT, *Chancelaria de D. João III, Doações* 69, fol. 98v.

⁹⁴ António Baião, *História Quinhentista...*, pp. 306, 309-310.

⁹⁵ Lucas Veiga was given the voyage-concession to Bengal for his participation in the defence of Diu. António Baião, *História Quinhentista...*, p. 327.

⁹⁶ Dom Leitão was permitted to send a ship to Maldives with along with Jerónimo Butaqua as reward for his role in the defence of Diu. *Ibidem*, p. 327.

⁹⁷ Simão da Rocha was granted permission to send a vessel to Malacca as reward for his role in the defence of Diu. *Ibidem*, p. 327.

⁹⁸ Sebastião Lopez Lobato was made the *alcaide mor* of Goa. *Ibidem*, p. 328.

⁹⁹ Francisco Navaes Pereira was rewarded with a commercial voyage to Bengal. *Ibidem*, p. 328.

¹⁰⁰ Vasco Rebello was granted commercial privilege to send vessels to Bengal and Hormuz. Bibliotheca do Palacio da Ajuda, *Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro*, 51-8-46, fol. 241v.

¹⁰¹ Pedro de Liao was rewarded with a commercial voyaged to Bengal. Biblioteca do Palácio da Ajuda, *Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro*, 51-8-46, fol. 164v.

¹⁰² J. H. da Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Arquivo...*, fasc. I, p. 8.

¹⁰³ For details see Biblioteca do Palácio da Ajuda, *Livro das Mercês que fez D. João de Castro*, 51-8-46.

tial component. Thus later when Malacca was sieged, wealth and men from Cochin were increasingly mobilized and utilized to lift the siege. In 1587 on the requests from the *Estado* authorities, the Municipal council of Cochin contributed an amount of 13,560 *xerafins* for the relief of Malacca, which was spent primarily for outfitting and manning a ship as well as for the delivery of food supplies to Malacca.¹⁰⁴ This amount was raised by reallocating city's working fund and by taking loans from individuals and institutions of the city. Out of this amount about 1000 *xerafins* were borrowed from the funds earmarked for orphans and usually managed by the *Santa Casa da Misericórdia*. An amount of 5,228 *xerafins* was raised from 180 Portuguese *casados* of Cochin. From the local indigenous merchants (*gente da terra*) as well as from the Gujarati and Ceylonese merchants trading in Cochin an amount of 1267 *xerafins* was borrowed. Moreover, an amount of 2,189 *xerafins* was taken from the fund gathered for the social relief of the orphans of Cochin and for their burial, while the city reallocated 3876 *xerafins* collected as municipal tax at the customs house of Cochin.¹⁰⁵ This reveals the extent to which the cities were made to get involved and integrated with the defense strategy of the *Estado* possessions, particularly in times of emergency.

However, with the increasing dependence on the urban dwellers of Cochin and Goa for its defence and sustenance, the *Estado* had also to make several commercial concessions to keep the urban elites to the tune of the state. Several navigational channels kept by the crown rather monopolistically were liberalized and handed over to the private traders. The crown began to rent out voyages to South East Asia to the city-dwellers of Goa and Cochin on a considerable scale from 1570 onwards.¹⁰⁶ Consequently the amount of the wealth that got accumulated in these cities got considerably augmented and it is indicated mainly by the increase in the income of the cities of Goa and Cochin. The customs money obtained from the trade in horses in Goa rose to 60,000 *pardaos* of gold, while that from the spices increased to 4850 *pardaos* in 1571. In the same year the income from silk trade in Goa rose to 4200 *pardaos*, whereas the income from trade in cotton clothes and textiles was 2110 *pardaos*.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile the *casados* from Goa began to take up voyages rather frequently to Bengal, South East Asia, China as well as Japan by 1580.¹⁰⁸ Following the intensification of *casado* trade, by 1590s the customs duty on spices was farmed out for 7755 *xerafins*, and that

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon (BNL), *Fundo Geral*, Codices 1979 and 1980.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. BNL, *Fundo Geral*, 1979, folio 1-6v.

¹⁰⁶ Luís Filipe Thomaz, "The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago", p. 77.

¹⁰⁷ Artur Teodoro de Matos (ed.), *O Orçamento do Estado da Índia 1571*, Lisboa, 1999, pp. 57-9.

¹⁰⁸ For details see *Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da Índia*, published by Francisco Mendes da Luz in *Boletim da Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra*, vol. XXI, Coimbra, 1953.

of food-grains was farmed out for 11,630 *xerafins* in Goa.¹⁰⁹ However, during the period between 1587 and 1598, the total value of private trade of the *casados* in Cochin was more than 8,819,500 *pardaos*, out of which the city of Cochin bagged an amount of 88,195 *pardaos*, 4 *tangas* and 32 *reais*, as one per cent duty collected from the various commodities imported by the *casados*.¹¹⁰ Confining their trade networks within Asia, these *casados* never allowed their wealth go out of Asia or get transferred to the mother country. However the state in times of exigencies banked heavily upon this private wealth to tide over financial difficulties and to defend its possessions. When the Dutch threat was increasingly felt on the Portuguese territories, it was the wealth from these cities that was greatly channelized for defence purposes. The *Estado* borrowed huge amount of money for defence and trade purposes from private traders of Goa like Fernand Cron and Cochin. The *casado* traders of Cochin gave the state an amount of 1,40,345 *xerafins* as loan in 1610,¹¹¹ whereas Fernand Cron of Goa gave a loan of 20,000 ducats during the time of intensified threats from the Dutch (c.1612-17),¹¹² which in most cases the state could not repay. Meanwhile, the state also banked upon the capital and commercial expertise of the city-dwellers of Cochin to make spices available in Portugal by entering into contract with the city of Cochin for dispatching regular *navetas* to Lisbon in the second quarter of the seventeenth century.¹¹³

Spatialization and the Integration of the Cities with the State

The magnificence of the city of Cochin depended greatly on the wealth that it bagged over a long period of time from its trading activities, conducted in a relatively free manner thanks to its distance from the power center of Goa.

¹⁰⁹ Francisco Xavier Ernesto Fernandes, *Regimen do Sal, Abkary e Alfandegas da India*, Lisboa, 1905, pp. 23-27.

¹¹⁰ BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No.1980, "Livro das Despezas de hum por cento", *Taboada section*, fols.1-2.

¹¹¹ For details on the wealthy *casados* of Cochin, who used to lend money to the state, see AHU, *Índia*, caixa 2, doc. 89; fols. 1-4; 11, 15, dated 27-1-1613. In order to understand the financial crisis which the Portuguese experienced during this period, see Pius Malekandathil (ed.), *Jornada of Dom Alexis de Menezes: A Portuguese Account of the Sixteenth Century Malabar*, Kochi, 2003, pp. LXII-LXIV.

¹¹² Charles R. Boxer, "Uma raridade bibliográfica sobre Fernão Cron", in *Boletim internacional de bibliografia luso-brasileira*, XII, 3, Lisboa, 1971, p. 330; Hermann Kellenbenz, "Cron, Ferdinand 1559-1637", in Wolfgang Zorn (ed.), *Lebensbilder aus dem Bayerischen Schwaben*, Reihe 3, Bd. 9, 1974, p. 210; Pius Malekandathil, *The Germans, the Portuguese and India*, Münster, 1999, p. 105.

¹¹³ BNL, Cod. No. 11410, fols. 173-178. Contract to send *navetas* to Lisbon from Cochin. The *casados* of Cochin used to send *navetas* to Lisbon rather regularly from 1628 to 1638.

The distance factor allowed its trade to be carried out according to the aspirations of the *casados*, who managed the affairs by joining hands with local ruler, in whose territory the port was situated,¹¹⁴ and the indigenous merchant groups having extensive trade networks. The local ruler kept a low customs duty to attract more trade to his port and thus more wealth to his coffers,¹¹⁵ while the indigenous traders and *casados* resorted to the strategy of ware-and – vessel exchange. By the ware-exchange strategy, the *bania* traders made use of their commercial connections with the *casados* to get the cargo of the former out of the customs house of Cochin at the reduced rate stipulated as a privilege for the married Portuguese citizens,¹¹⁶ while by vessel exchange strategy, the *casados* of Cochin made use of the vessels of the Gujarati and other indigenous merchants to dispatch commodities to non-Portuguese ports and destinations.¹¹⁷ During this period the weight of Portuguese power was not sufficiently felt in Cochin as to dissociate this syndicate and make wealth flow to the *Estado* treasury. Eventually in the urban space of Cochin much more attention was given to the immediate concerns and economic interests of the city-dwellers than to the larger interests of the state.

In the evolving scenario, the spatialization process in Cochin and Goa began to take a course favouring more the interests of their private traders than those of the crown. Consequently an evident shift in the core area of urbanization was also seen during this period from politically and administratively important structures to commercially important streets or structures. Thus for example the core area of city life in Goa turned out to be the street-space named *Rua Direita* (Straight Street), which was occupied on both sides by lapidaries, goldsmiths, the rich, and the better merchants and craftsmen, while each class of artisans and traders stayed together in localities.¹¹⁸ In Cochin too the street called *Rua Direita*, where the principal buildings of Cochin including bishop's house, municipal chamber, *Misericórdia*, Dominican monastery etc., were located, developed into the hub

¹¹⁴ K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 53, pp. 73-6.

¹¹⁵ Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, pp. 214-5.

¹¹⁶ AHU, *Índia*, cx. 2, doc. 4, dated 12-1-1612; cx. 2, doc. 73, dated 23-12-1612; K. S. Mathew and Afzal Ahmad (ed.), *Emergence of Cochin...*, doc. 53, pp. 77-83; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Cochin in Decline, 1600-1650: Myth and Manipulation in the *Estado da Índia*", pp. 67-8.

¹¹⁷ HAG, *Livro das Monções*, No.7(1600-3), fols. 35-44, letter of the king to Viceroy, Aires de Saldanha, dated 6-1-1601; J. H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo...*, fascículo 3, pp.660-1.

¹¹⁸ Joseph Velinkar, "The Portuguese Conquest and Goa's Political and Administrative History up to 1788", A Paper presented in the National Seminar on The History of Goa: *Issues, Trends and Perspectives*, organized by the Department of History, Goa University, May 5-7, 2003, pp. 5-7; The details of the city plan of Goa during this period are given by D. João de Castro and Linschoten. For a sketch of the city of Goa by D. João de Castro in 1539, see Georg Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier...*, vol. II, p. 147. See also Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, *Histoire de la Navigation de Jan Hvgves de Linscot Hollandais et de son voyage es Indes Orientales*, Amsterdam, 1610.

of the city-life.¹¹⁹ A great portion of the wealth bagged by the *casados* by way of private trade went to the construction works of huge and magnificent civil and ecclesiastical edifices of Goa and Cochin. In this process wealth was made to be transferred into impressive and power-denoting permanent structures through the visual media of architecture and monumental buildings like the houses of the Dominicans, the Augustinians, Bom Jesus Basilica, Se Cathedral, São Paulo College of Goa,¹²⁰ and the three-storeyed magnificent Madre Deus college of Cochin, the Dominican and Augustinian monasteries of Cochin.¹²¹ Though these multiple edifices served a variety of civil and ecclesiastical purposes in both the cities, they in fact invited the admiration and bewilderment of the natives for whom these awesome structures virtually appeared to be symbols of domination.

As distanced away from power center, Cochin's urban lay-out and concerns were greatly decided by the private interests of the *casados*. We find a tendency among the private traders to keep the water-side of the city wall of Cochin open for enabling frequent movement of their vessels and commodities without any interruption. In spite of the repeated orders of the crown to repair the city-wall and to strengthen the fortification, the water-side of the city was deliberately kept unattended to for facilitating the trading endeavours of the *casados*, a development in which local concerns took precedence over more distant ones and the

¹¹⁹ Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, pp. 75; 110-111.

¹²⁰ A wide variety of buildings including church buildings started appearing in Goa during this period, following the accumulation and channelization of commercial capital. The Franciscan started their house in Goa in 1517 with a Commissary to look after their affairs. Cf. A. A. Moreira, "As Antigas Províncias Franciscanas Portuguesas da Índia" in *Franciscanismo em Portugal*, vol. 3-4, Lisboa, 1996, p. 99. The Jesuits came in Goa in 1542 and erected São Paulo College, Bom Jesus Basilica, etc. Fortunato de Almeida, *História da Igreja em Portugal*, vol. II, Porto, 1968, pp. 168-70. The Dominicans established themselves as a community in Goa in 1548 and eventually they built the Dominican monastery. Cf. Luís de Caçegas, *Terceira Parte da História de Domingos: Particular do Reino e Conquista de Portugal*, Lisboa, 1678. The Augustinians arrived in Goa in 1572 and eventually erected their monastery in this city. Arnulf Hartman, "The Augustinians in Golden Goa: A Manuscript by Felix of Jesus" in *Anacleto Augustiniana*, vol. XXX, Rome, 1967, p. 21. The construction work of these monasteries and other church buildings as well as civic buildings was done primarily during this period, when private trade thrived. For details on the religious policy of the Portuguese during this period, see Teotónio R. de Souza, "The Religious Policy of the Portuguese in Goa, 1510-1800", in *The Portuguese and the Socio-Cultural Changes in India, 1500-1800*, edited by K. S. Mathew, Teotónio R. de Souza and Pius Malekandathil, Fundação Oriente/IRISH Thalasserry, 2001, pp. 437-448. The preliminary works of the cathedral church of Goa were completed by 1534 and what remained incomplete in that year were the tower and the sacristy. IAN/TT, *Gavetas*, 20-1-53, the letter of Vicar General P.º Miguel Vaz addressed to the king of Portugal.

¹²¹ For detail see Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India*, pp. 91-96; Gervasis Mulakara, *History of the Diocese of Cochin: European Missionaries in Cochin 1292-1558*, vol. I, Rome, 1986, pp. 35-70.

private interests gaining upper hand over state interests.¹²² The state could not fortify it and keep the city in the way it wanted, because of the relative distance from power center. However, though the city of Goa also depended on trade surplus for its florescence and magnificence, it evolved as an urban unit experiencing the weight of power center all through its stages of development. The weight of the power exercised by ecclesiastical and civil authorities and institutions of Goa transferred an inner dynamics into its urban space for keeping the commercially moving city-dwellers integrated with the state frame. A wide variety of tools were used by them for integrating the otherwise scattered spatial units of the city into the frames of the state. In this process of consolidation all the potentially divisive elements like difference in customs, traditions and practices were made to disappear in the name of religion, for implementing which legislations were made in the Goan Provincial councils and rigorous execution was realized by Inquisition.¹²³ Even when the urban elite went to farthest corners of Asian waters they had to bank upon power center of Goa either to get legitimacy and sanction for their ventures or to get the state involved in the affairs of their private trade as to ensure security.¹²⁴

However the cities of Cochin and Goa experienced a mass exodus of inhabitants, leading to a drastic reduction in their urban demographic strength from the second decade of the seventeenth century onwards. In Cochin it started with the increasing diversion of spices through the ghat route to the Coromandel ports like Nagapattanam, Mylapore, Masulipatanam and Pulicate, following the tensions between the Portuguese authorities and the spice-producing St. Thomas Christians of the hinterland since the synod of Diamper (1599).¹²⁵ Consequently supply of pepper in Cochin got increasingly diminished following which the vessels of *Carreira da Índia* also stopped coming to Cochin for taking spices for Portugal from 1611 onwards.¹²⁶ With the increasing flow of spices from the spice-producing hinterland of Kerala to Coromandel coast through the ghat-route,

¹²² HAG, *Livro das Monções*, No. 3A (1585-9), fols. 346-7; J. H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo...*, fascículo 3, pp. 81; 185; BNL, Codice No. 1976, fols. 158-9.

¹²³ A. Silva Rego, *História das Missões...*, vol. I, Lisboa, 1949, pp. 153-161; 246-255, 279-286; J. H. da Cunha Rivara, *Arquivo...*, fascículo 4, pp. 120-140; Teotónio R. de Sousa, "The Religious Policy of the Portuguese in Goa, 1510-1800", in K. S. Mathew, Teotónio R. de Souza and Pius Malekandathil (ed.), *The Portuguese and the Socio-Cultural Changes in India, 1500-1800*, Fundação Oriente, Lisboa/IRISH, Tellicherry, 2001, pp. 437-448.

¹²⁴ Examples are available for the frequent reliance of *casados* from Goa operating in Bengal increasingly banking upon Goa for legitimacy and military help.

¹²⁵ Pius Malekandathil, "The Portuguese and the Ghat-Route Trade: 1500-1663", in *Pondicherry University Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, vol. I, no. 1&2, 2000, pp. 135-150; see also Pius Malekandathil (ed.), *Jornada of Dom Alexis de Menezes: A Portuguese Account of the Sixteenth Century Malabar*, Kochi, 2003, pp. LXI-LXIV.

¹²⁶ Pius Malekandathil, *Portuguese Cochin...*, p. 254.

there commenced a mass exodus of *casados* from 1612 onwards from Cochin to Nagapattinam, Mylapore and other parts of eastern coast to take advantage of the changed situation. Some of them even moved to Bengal, Pegu and Ceylon.¹²⁷ Following these developments and particularly with the increasing exodus of the *casados*, the demographic strength of Cochin got reduced almost to one-third (*a ponto de só uma terça parte estar habitada*) and consequently the city began to lose vibrancy of its trade.¹²⁸ These *casados*, with the new base in Coromandel, started making higher profit by distributing the pepper of Kerala coming through the ghat-route to Bengal, Pegu and China as well as to the Dutch in Masulipatanam and Pulicate.¹²⁹ However the impact of the exodus of city-dwellers from Cochin was so great on its economy and urban life that many still went on deserting the city. At the time of the Dutch conquest in 1663, it was estimated that although there were 900 old houses in the Portuguese city, only 173 were actually inhabited.¹³⁰ Most of them seem to have been vacated much earlier.

In Goa the exodus of city-dwellers began with the recurring outbreak of pestilences and epidemics, particularly the ones that broke out in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, which also took a heavy toll of life. With the increasing water pollution, because of the porous nature of the soil, the city of Goa became quite uninhabitable and the *casados* started moving out of the core area of the Portuguese power to safer places, where they could conduct their trade profitably.¹³¹ During the period between 1604 and 1634 about 25,000 Portuguese soldiers died in the Royal Hospital of Goa.¹³² Though in 1580 the number of Christians in the city of Goa was 60,000¹³³ and there were as many as 20,000 Hindus by the end of the sixteenth century,¹³⁴ the population decreased

¹²⁷ AHU, *Índia*, caixa 2, doc. 107. The letter of the city council of Cochin sent to Philip II (Philip III of Spain) giving account of the economic condition of Cochin, dated 21-12-1613.

¹²⁸ AHU, *Índia*, caixa 2, doc. 107. The letter of the city council of Cochin sent to Philip II (Philip III of Spain) giving an account of the economic condition of Cochin dated 21-12-1613; Pius Malekandathil, "The Portuguese and the Ghat-Route Trade: 1500-1663", pp. 145-6; HAG, *Livro das Monções*, No. 12 (1613-7), fols. 254-80, March 1617.

¹²⁹ BNL, *Fundo Geral*, Codice No. 1815, fols. 78-78v. The letter of Philip II sent to Conde da Vidigueira, dated 26-3-1625; AHU, *Índia*, caixa 8, doc. 38, dated 29-10-1624.

¹³⁰ Hugo s Jakob (ed.), *De Nederlanders in Kerala, 1663-1701, De Memories en instructies betreffende het commandement Malabar van de Vereinigde Oost Indische Compagnie*, The Hague, 1976, pp. lii-liiii.

¹³¹ Cosme Jose Costa, *The Heritage of Govapuri: A Study of the Artifacts in and around the Pilar Seminary Museum*, Pilar-Goa, 2002.

¹³² M. N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India*, Delhi, 1990, p. 93.

¹³³ Diogo do Couto, *Da Asia dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimiento das Terras e Mares do Oriente*, Decada X, Parte I, liv. 1, Lisboa, 1788, p. 48.

¹³⁴ Teotónio R de Souza, *Goa Medieval, A Cidade e o Interior no Século XVII*, Lisboa, 1993, p. 111. In 1623 it was pointed out by a Portuguese that about 150,000 Hindus continued to live

considerably by seventeenth century. This is indicated to a great extent by the fact that the city had only about 3000 houses in 1620, which according to Francisco Bethencourt represented a maximum number of only 45,000 people.¹³⁵ Even this estimation cannot be totally relied upon, as one does not have sources to cross-check how many of these houses remained vacant because of the exodus of the *casados* from the city and how many of them were actually occupied by the city-dwellers. The figures given by Antonio Bocarro suggest that the city was undergoing radical demographic crisis during this period. According to him there were only 800 white *casados* (white married citizens) and 2500 black *casados* (descendants of the Portuguese by way of mixed marriage) in Goa in 1635.¹³⁶ All these are indicative of the catastrophic fall in the urban population of Goa due to the recurring epidemics and pestilences. In 1639 a serious epidemic struck Goa, laying low Viceroy Pedro da Silva himself.¹³⁷ In their attempts to escape from the recurring epidemics, many people began to flee from the city of Goa en bloc to safer trading centers, many of which were located in the peripheral zones of the empire like Coromandel and Bengal on the east coast and Mangalore on the west coast. When the urban population started deserting the city, attempts were being made to shift the base of Portuguese power of India from the city of Goa to Mormugao, where a fort had already been built in 1624 to counter the attacks of the Dutch.¹³⁸ The problem of demographic decline in Goa does not seem to have been so acute as in Cochin. However with the flight of the wealthy segment from both of these cities, life and vigour went out of the core areas of the *Estado*, leading eventually to its decay and subsequent withering away.

Thus the cities of Cochin and Goa explain a wide varieties of logical processes and mechanisms by which the *Estado da Índia* got shaped and re-shaped as it advanced over years. Both the cities provided the first group of citizens to the state, who because of their elite status, played a crucial role in deciding what the nature of the evolving *Estado* should be. The state made use of the city-dwellers to make wealth accumulated in their habit, by means of private

under the Portuguese protection in Goa. M. N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India...*, p. 118. Hindus formed an important segment of the urban life of Goa that even in the seventeenth century 80% of the holders of *rendas* were Hindus, while the Christians held only 20%. *Ibidem*, p. 113.

¹³⁵ Francisco Bethencourt, "Low Cost Empire: Interaction between the Portuguese and Local Societies in Asia" in Ernst van Veen and Leonard Blussé (ed.), *Rivalry and Conflict...*, pp. 115-6. M. N. Pearson says that the population in the city of Goa had declined to 20,000 by late in the century. M. N. Pearson, *The Portuguese in India...*, p. 134.

¹³⁶ Antonio Bocarro, *Livro das Plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental*, Lisboa, 1992.

¹³⁷ Joseph Velinkar, "The Portuguese Conquest and Goa's Political and Administrative History up to 1788", pp. 8-9.

¹³⁸ R. J. Barendse, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century*, New Delhi, p. 209.

trade legitimized by the system of licenses, trade concessions and commercial voyages. However in return the *Estado* also managed to get the wealth of the *casados* channelized for its state building ventures as well as for defending its far-flung possessions. The city-dwellers were also encouraged to donate liberally to the building processes of monumental structures and elegant edifices in Cochin and Goa, as to construct a power-space with highly impressive and awe-evoking structures. By offering material and human resources liberally to the state during the times of emergencies, the *casados* of Goa and Cochin, in turn, made themselves acceptable before the crown and in that way they ensured further privileges and concessions for their intra-Asian trading activities.

Goa being the seat of civil and ecclesiastical authority experienced the weight of power in the process of consolidating its urban space and in integrating the commercially moving city-dwellers into the frame of the state. Difference in belief systems, customs and practices were made to disappear and homogenization was effected in the city of Goa through the multiple church legislations implemented with the help of the tools of Inquisition. However the settlers of Cochin, distanced away from power center had much more centrifugal tendencies, who went on expanding their commercial networks to the peripheries of the *Estado*, causing the fluid boundaries of the state expanding along with them. Nevertheless with the drastic fall in the demographic strength experienced in Cochin because of the exodus of Cochinites to Coromandel ports following the dwindling of pepper trade in Cochin since the Diamper synod and in Goa because of the flight of urban population following the recurring outbreak of epidemics, channels for the flow of wealth got drained in both the cities, consequently their splendour and magnificence started waning. By 1650 what remained in Cochin and Goa were almost dead buildings rather than living citizens, who could give vitality and vigour to such structures. Both the cities appeared almost like huge trees with little roots, out of which Cochin fell drastically and Goa survived, when the winds of attacks came from the Dutch. With the fall of Cochin a bulk of commercial space which was held together by multiple networks of navigational lines and out of which the state derived an enormous amount of strength, got completely cut off from the *Estado*.

AS VISÕES DO OUTRO CHINÊS, JAPONÊS E FILIPINO E OS MÉTODOS DE MISSIONAÇÃO.

NOTAS PARA UMA HISTÓRIA COMPARADA DOS JESUÍTAS DO PADROADO E DO PATRONATO

TERESA LACERDA *

A palavra *outro* tem a grandeza de ser uma antinomia, retendo em si duas verdades contraditórias. Outro – significa não ser o mesmo, como tal, aquele que é diferente, distinto. No entanto, entre os seus sinónimos encontramos também o semelhante e até mesmo o igual. Se a problemática do tema começa na própria palavra as dúvidas vão para lá da filologia.

Como é que o europeu apreendeu o *outro* desconhecido é um tema clássico abordado pelos investigadores de Ciências Sociais.¹ Sendo um trabalho de natureza antropológica,² não deixa de ser um dos territórios privilegiados da História

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¹ A interdisciplinariedade do problema ficou bem representada no colóquio *Imagem e Diferença: entre a identificação do outro e o conhecimento de si mesmo*, organizado por Ângela Barreto Xavier e Nuno Senos, nos dias 9 e 10 de Novembro de 2007, no Instituto de Ciências Sociais, em Lisboa. Neste encontro participaram historiadores, historiadores de arte, antropólogos e sociólogos.

² Uma simples investigação sobre os cursos de mestrado e doutoramento apresentados pelos departamentos de Antropologia permite concluir que as temáticas em torno da Identidade, Migração e Etnicidade continuam a ter uma forte preponderância nesta disciplina. Todas estas abordagens têm como pano de fundo a questão do *outro*. Já nos anos 60 do século XX, a antropóloga Margaret T. Hodgen expôs a grande afinidade do tema com a Antropologia. Na sua obra, *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) a autora demonstrou como as necessidades e as práticas que motivaram o aparecimento da Antropologia remontam a outras épocas, nomeadamente, aos séculos XVI e XVII, quando os europeus tiveram necessidade de descrever e compreender os homens e culturas dos “Novos Mundos”.